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SECTION 102 AND PERSONAL HOLDING
COMPANY PROVISIONS OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
By HARRY J. RUDICIt
I. INTRODUCTION
IN any income tax system which imposes higher rates of tax on in-
dividuals than on corporations, a provision to prevent, or at least to
discourage, the use of the corporate entity as a means of avoiding the
higher individual rates is virtually indispensable. Unhampered by such
a provision, the industrialist or investor in the high surtax brackets
will obviously find it advantageous to incorporate his business or form
a corporation to hold his investments. By interposing the corporate
entity between his income and himself and accumulating in the corporation
whatever part of its income is not required for his personal needs or
desires, he will be able to escape the surtax on the amount accumulated.
The need for a deterrent becomes acute at a time like the present when
the maximum rate of tax on individual incomes is 79 ' while the maxi-
mum rate of tax on corporate incomes is only 19% ;1 so that incorpora-
tion and the consequent insulation of the corporate income against surtax
would effect a maximum saving of 60%.2 Thus an important problem
t Lecturer in Law, New York University Law School; Member of New York Bar.
1. Beginning with 1940, the maximum rate of corporation income tax will be IS%.
IN-T. Ray. CoDE §§ 13, 14.
2. The rates of individual tax pass the corporation rate at about 20,000, depending
on individual status. It is interesting to note that in 1923, when the spread between the
maximum corporate and individual income tax rates w%-as only 111,. the staff of the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation in its report for that year recommended
the abandonment of § 220 (corresponding to § 102 of the present law) and the substitu-
tion of a provision which would allow the corporation a deduction in computing net in-
come equal to a percentage of the excess of dividends paid over dividends received; in
other words, a form of undistributed profits tax. The Committee itself neither approved
nor disapproved this recommendation. Report of the Joint Comnmittee on Intrnal RCVC1'te
Taxation, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) 2, 4S-56.
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is created: how may the revenue be safeguarded without at the same
time interfering with legitimate corporate expansion? The Government
has probably lost more than one billion dollars in tax because of the
barrier between corporate earnings and individual surtax.
3
Congress recognized the problem at the very beginning, and conse-
quently every income tax law since the Sixteenth Amendment has con-
tained some provision4 designed to prevent the utilization of corporations
as a means of escaping the surtax. The present Internal Revenue Code
contains multiple provisions for this purpose.' The first of these' has
had its counterpart in all previous income tax laws. It now relates only
to corporations other than personal holding companies and imposes a
penalty tax on corporations formed or availed of to prevent the im-
position of the surtax on their shareholders through the medium of
accumulating instead of distributing their profits. A second set of pro-
visions' relates to "foreign" s personal holding companies. These sections
do not impose any tax on the corporation itself, but instead, speaking
generally, require the shareholders to include in their individual income
tax returns their pro rata shares of the undistributed net income of the
company. The third group of provisions0 relates to personal holding
companies other than "foreign" personal holding companies. This last
set of provisions imposes a prohibitively high surtax on, again speaking
generally, the undistributed net income of the corporation regardless of
the reason for non-distribution.
3. GREEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN TAXATION (1933) 140. This
figure is undoubtedly very conservative. Cf. estimate contained in minority report of Sen-
ate Finance Committee on the 1936 Act, SEN. Ra,. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936)
pt. 2, at 2, that more than 600 million dollars of revenue would be lost for 1937 alone.
4. 1913 ACT, § II, A, 2; 1916 ACT, § 3; 1917 ACT, § 1206 (2) (amending § 10 of
1916 ACT); 1918 ACT, § 220; 1921, 1924, and 1926 ACTS, §220; 1928 and 1932 ACTS,
§ 104; 1933 ACT (NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT) § 214 (amending § 104 of 1932
ACT); 1934 AT, § 102 and Tit. 1-A (§ 351) ; 1935 ACT, § 109 (amending § 351 of 1934
ACT); 1936 ACT, §§ 14, 102, and Title 1-A (§ 351); 1937 ACT, Tit. I and II; 1938 AcT,
§§ 13, 102, 331-340 (Supplement P), and Title 1-A (§ 401 et seq.) INT. REV. CODE, §§ 102,
331-340, 500-511; 1939 ACT, § 211 (f) (g) and (i) (amending certain of the above men-
tioned sections of the CODE).
5. INT. REV. CODE § 102. The personal holding company provisions are: §§ 331-
340 (foreign personal holding companies) ; §§ 500-511 (other personal holding Companies)
References to section numbers in this study are to sections of the Internal Revenue
Code unless otherwise indicated.
6. INT. REv. CODE § 102.
7. INT. REv. CODE §§ 331-340 inclusive, commonly known as Supplement P.
8. The word "foreign" as applied to personal holding companies has a technical
meaning. See p. 207 et seq. infra. This technical meaning is intended herein except where
otherwise indicated.
9. IxT. REV. CODE §§ 500-511 (Subchapter A of Chapter 2).
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II. BACKGROUND
1. History Prior to 1934. Space limitations forbid a complete his-
torical treatment of the progenitors of the provisions under discussion.
Herein it is proposed to describe briefly the earlier provisions and to
discuss more fully the amendments made since the beginning of 1934
when the accumulation penalty section applicable to ordinary corpora-
tions first acquired its present number,(and the personal holding company
as a special concept of income tax law first emerged.)
From the beginning of the modern income tax era (1913) the income
tax law has contained a penalty section'0 applicable to corporations formed
or availed of " for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the
surtax on their shareholders through the medium of accumulating the
earnings instead of distributing them. However, the Acts passed from
1913 to 1918 did not impose any penalty on the corporation itself; instead
the shareholders of a corporation guilty of harboring the condemned
purpose were taxed on their pro rata shares of the company's earnings.
In 1920, doubts about the constitutionality of this method of applying
the penalty were roused by the Supreme Court's decision in Eisner v.
Macomber.'2 The majority opinion intimated' a that a tax on the share-
holders' respective shares of the undistributed earnings of the corpora-
tion, prior to dividend declaration, was not an income tax but a property
tax which would have to be apportioned according to population." In
1921 Congress, apprehensive that the whole penalty section might be
invalid,'5 abandoned the scheme of taxing the shareholders and began,
with the law of that year, to impose the penalty tax against the cor-
poration.' From 1921 to 1934, various amendments' 7 were made to
eliminate defects in the 1921 Act by strengthening the section and in-
creasing the penalty.
10. See note 4 supra.
11. Under the 1913 and 1916 Acts, the phrase was "fraudulently formed or availed
of;" but the word "fraudulently" was dropped in the 1918 Act. See Rcport of Senale
Committee on Finance, SE-x. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (191S) 52.
12. 252 U. S. 189 (1920). It was held, in a five to four decision, that the income
tax on a stock dividend of common on common wvas unconstitutional.
13. 252 U. S. 189, 217-S (1920).
14. In Collector v. Hubbard, 79 U. S. 102 (1871), the Supreme Court had held valid
a provision in one of the Civil War Income Tax Acts which required the shareholders
of a corporation to include in taxable income their proportionate shares of the corpora-
tion's income, whether distributed or not. The majority in the Macomber case declared
that the Hubbard case was overruled by Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 153
U. S. 601 (1895), but it may still be good law. See discussion infra pp. 210-211.
15. See H. R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) 13; SE-.. R,.p. No. 275
(1921) 16-17.
16. But the tax on the corporation could be avoided if the stockholders agreed to be
taxed on their distributive shares of the corporation's net income in the same manner as
the members of a partnership. REavEuE Acr oF 1921, § 220.
17. See note 4 supra.
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The validity of the original method of imposing the penalty tax on
the shareholders rather than against the corporation was never directly
tested in the courts.'8
2. Act of 1934. In 1934, the accumulation penalty section was
renumbered 102, its present number, and substantial changes were made.
The tax became a graduated surtax:"9 25% on the first $100,000 of
the adjusted net income, and 35% on the remainder.2" A separate classi-
fication of "personal holding companies" - a purely statutory concept -
was created. Corporations within this category were excluded from the
application of the penalty section and were made subject to a special
surtax of 30% on the first $100,000 of their undistributed net income
and 40% on the remainder.2 As we shall see, the personal holding com-
pany provisions of the 1934 Act contained so many loopholes that they
missed many of their objectives.
3. Act of 1936.22 The 1936 Act ushered in the much maligned un-
distributed profits tax.2 This tax proved to be such a stimulus to the
declaration of dividends that it highlighted the comparative inefficiency of
Section 102.24 Under the undistributed profits tax provisions of the
1936 Act, a corporation which did not distribute all of its earnings was
18. The 1916 provision was indirectly involved in Kales v. Woodworth, 32 F. (2d)
37 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929). This case is unique in that it is the only one where the tax-
payer was asking for rather than fighting the application of the statutory penalty. Cf.
Maurice L. Stern, 11 B.T.A. 1309 (1928). The 1918 Act was involved in United Business
Corp. of America v. Comm'r, 19 B.T.A. 809 (1930), aff'd, 62 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A.
2d, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 635 (1933), but the constitutional question did not
arise as it was held that the company was not guilty of the condemned purpose for the
year controlled by the 1918 Act.
19. The reason for this change is explained in Report of the Senate Committee on
Finance, SEN. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 31.
20. The section was also amended to make it plain that the penalty tax is applicable
where the corporation is used to prevent the imposition of surtax upon the shareholders
of another corporation, e.g., a parent corporation, as well as against its own shareholders.
See Report of the Ways and Means Committee, H. R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934) 12. In Mead Corp. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 687 (1938), it was held in a somewhat
labored opinion (from which six members dissented) that this change was merely declar-
atory of the intention of the prior law.
21. REVENuE AcT OF 1934, § 351.
22. The 1935 Act made no change in Section 102, but did provide new and higher
rates of personal holding surtax which never became operative, being superseded by
the 1936 Act.
23. REVENUE AcT OF 1936, § 14.
24. Up to Oct. 1, 1926, only 78 cases had been considered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for application of the corresponding sections of prior laws. From Oct. 1, 1926,
to June 25, 1927, 158 additional cases were considered. Up to that time, there were no
Court or Board decisions on the section. Report of Joint Committee on Internal Rcvn11
Taxation, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., (1928) 49. But by November 1932, the Bureau had con-
sidered more than 2,000 cases. Grimes, Surtax Rate Increase and Corporate Surpis
Accumulations (1932) 10 TAX. MAG. 403.
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subject to a surtax which was graduated according to the percentage of
earnings distributed, the maxiinum rate of such surtax being 27%.
Accordingly, it was felt that in the case of corporations subject to this
undistributed profits tax, the rates imposed by Section 102 would be
too high, and the penalty rates in the case of such corporations were
reduced from 25% and 35% to 15% and 25%.20 The 25% and 35%
penalty rates were retained as to corporations not subject to the undis-
tributed profits tax, such as banks and insurance companies. The 1936
Act also made important changes in the computation of the income
subject to the penalty tax. Most of these amendments are incorporated
in the present Law.
4. Loophole Law of 1937. In 1937 came the "Loophole Law,"f
S
designed to plug the loopholes in the income tax law brought to light in
the hearings during the summer of 1937 before the Congressional Joint
Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance. -0 So far as we are con-
cerned here, these hearings disclosed four major media for escaping tax,
all of which were virtually rendered useless by the 1937 Act. These may
be classified 3" as: (a) incorporated pocketbooks (ordinary personal
holding companies), (b) incorporated talents, (c) incorporated yachts
and country estates, (d) foreign personal holding corporations.
(a) Incorporated pocketbooks. The 1934 and 1936 Acts had set up
personal holding companies in a separate classification, and had subjected
them to surtax rates on their undistributed income.Y' However, the
Congressional draftsmen had left some yawning crevices. In the first
place, 20% of the income could be accumulated without penalty. Secondly,
the rates of personal holding company surtax were lower than the in-
dividual rates of tax of shareholders in the high brackets. Hence, despite
the personal holding company tax, it was still advantageous for such
wealthy taxpayers to accumulate the income in the corporation instead
of distributing it as a dividend; and since Section 102 was no longer
25. The effective rate was somewhat lower due to the fact that the normal tax vms
deductible in computing the net income which measured the surtax.
26. As personal holding companies under the 1936 Act were subject to the undis-
tributed profits surtax as well as the personal holding company surtax, the rates of the
latter, which had been increased in the 1935 Act (see note 2- mspra), were lowered.
27. See p. 180 infra, and note 56.
28. REvE-uE Acr oF 1937.
29. For a thorough understanding of the 1937 Act, a knowledge of its background
is practically essential. See Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of i937 (1937)
5 U. oF CHi. L. Rav. 41; Report of the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoid-
ance, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937).
30. Report of the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1937) 7. The term "incorporated pocketbook" had been used in the preliminary
report of a subcommittee, transmitted to the Ways and Means Committee, Decemb2r
4, 1933.
31. REVENUTE Acs oF 1934, 1936, § 351.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
applicable to such companies, no further penalty could be imposed on
them. Moreover, it was not very difficult to take a company out of the
personal holding company classification by having it invest in real estate
so that just over 20% of its gross income would be derived from rents."
For instance, the principal shareholder could 'transfer his country estate
to the corporation and pay the corporation sufficient rent so that more
than 20% of its gross income would be non-personal holding company
income, thus removing the corporation from the personal holding company
category. It is true that by removing itself from the personal holding
company class, the company opened itself to attack under Section 102,
but the penalty under that section was generally lighter; besides there
was always the chance of eluding it.
Another leak consisted of allowing personal holding companies - for
the purpose of the personal holding company surtax only - a deduction
for a net capital loss in excess of the $2,000 limitation allowed for normal
tax purposes. In other words, an individual owning a personal holding
company could, in effect, obtain the benefit of a larger capital loss than
if there were no company. There were pther minor gaps, such as the
allowance of a deduction for amounts tsed to retire certain indebted-
nesses.
38
Despite all these "cushions," the personal holding company provisions
of the 1934 and 1936 Acts were not quite so ineffective as one would
be led to believe from the testimony of Treasury officials in the hearings
before the Joint Committee. For instance, Commissioner Helvering's
statement that upon personal holding company incomes of approximately
$115,000,000 reported for 1935, less than $2,000,000 of surtax had been
collected was misleading. 4 The personal holding company surtax, like
the surtax imposed by Section 102, was not intended to produce revenue
per se. Instead, its primary purpose was to induce, or rather force, the
distribution of the income of personal holding companies to their stock-
holders so that the latter would become liable to surtax on such income.A5
32. Under the 1934 and 1936 Acts (as under the current law), one of the tests of a
personal holding company was the nature of its gross income. If more than 80% of
such income consisted of "personal holding company income" as defined in the statute, the
company met this test. Rents, however, were not within the definition of "personal hold-
ing company income;" hence a company which derived more than 20% of its gross income
from rents was not a personal holding company. Currently, rents are embraced by tile
definition of personal holding company income unless they constitute more than 50% of
the gross income. See pp. 209, 214 infra.
33. This particular deduction is still allowed.
34. Hearings before the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937) 149. The Commissioner's statement has since been repeated without
indication of its misleading character; Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937
(1937) U. oF CmrI. L. REv. 41, 60; Sanford Corp. v. Comm'r, C. C. A. 3d, Sept. 21, 1939.
35. Report of the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937) 2.
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Taking into account estimated individual income tax liability resulting
from extra dividends paid by personal holding companies, there was an
estimated tax revenue for 1935 of $49,000,000," ° of which $3,000,000
represented corporate surtax and the remainder, individual tax liability.
(b) Incorporated talents. The 1934 and 1936 personal holding com-
pany definition was not broad enough to include "talent" corporations
organized by high-salaried motion picture stars, musical virtuosos, writers,
cartoonists, and other persons with unique talents. Such individuals could
organize corporations and "sell themselves" to their corporations at
salaries which were sufficient to take care of their personal requirements,
but which were much less than the amounts for which such services could
be resold by the corporations. The amount thus retained by the corpora-
tion would, of course, escape surtax completely unless the corporation
was caught by Section 102.37 While it was possible for these companies
to be caught by Section 102, the Government, as will be seen, was not
uniformly successful in applying that section.38
(c) Incorporated yachts and country estates. It was found that in
meany cases wealthy individuals had transferred their yachts or country
estates to a wholly owned corporation, to which they also transferred
income-producing securities. They would pay to the corporation a rental
for the yacht or estate which might be a fair rental, i.e., as much as could
be obtained were the property to be offered to an outsider, but which would
be considerably less than the running expenses of the yacht or estate;
and the income from the securities would be used to make up the deficit,
so that the owner would escape tax on income from the securities.,"
(d) Foreign personal holding companies. Foreign corporations are
only subject to tax on income from United States sources.40 The United
States is apparently without jurisdiction to tax such corporations on
income from sources outside the country.41 Thus, if an American citizen
36. Id. at S.
37. In the hearings before the Joint Committee it w%-as brought out that Fritz Kreisler,
the violinist and composer, had organized two 'Maine corporations, to one of which
he had assigned the right to command his services, and to the other of which he had
assigned royalties. Id. at 248. Percy Crosby, the cartoonist, also formed a corporation
to which he transferred all of the rights to his character "Sldppy," and the right to
command his services at a salary which was much less than the amount his company
received. Id. at 247. At least two other cartoonists--"Bud" Fisher and Fontaine Fox-
organized similar corporations, as did at least two motion picture directors, William C.
and Cecil B. De.Mille. See pp. 196-197 infra. Cf. Charles Laughton, 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939).
38. Of the four incorporated talent cases which reached the courts for decision as
to the applicability of § 102, the Government won two and lost two. See p. 196 et seq.
infra.
39. Instances of the use of this device are contained in Hearings. supra note 34, at
226-240.
40. IxT. R v. CODE § 231(c).
41. Report of Joint Committee, supra note 35, at 16-17.
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organized a foreign corporation, transferred his funds to it and invested
those funds so that income from them would arise outside the United
States, the tax on such income would be completely avoided- except to
the extent that it might be distributed as a dividend. The reason is that
the income reached by Section 102, or the personal holding company
provisions of the 1934 and 1936 Acts, consists only of income from
United States sources in the case of a foreign corporation.42
All four of these chinks in the tax gathering armor were effectively
stopped up by the 1937 Act, which created a new classification of
"foreign" personal holding companies and very materially tightened the
provisions with respect to other personal holding companies, as will be
seen when the discussion of such companies is reached. Section 102 was
not changed except to exclude from its application foreign personal hold-
ing companies.
/ 5. Act of 1938. In 1938 the Treasury Department was apparently
still complaining,43 as it was back in 1918,44 that its failure to apply more
energetically the provisions of Section 102 was due to the inherent weak-
ness of the Statute. The law had provided from the beginning that a
prima facie presumption of the existence of the interdicted intent should
arise from the fact that a corporation was a mere holding company or
that its accumulation of earnings was in excess of the reasonable needs
of the business. But the Department complained that these presumptions
afforded scant aid in effectively applying the penalty section. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had just reversed the decision
of the Board of Tax Appeals in the National Grocery Company case, 4
and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had also affirmed
the Board's decision in the Cecil De Mille case. 41 Stung by the re-
versal in the National Grocery Company case, and the loss of the Cecil
De Mille case, which the Supreme Court had declined to review, the
Treasury Department appealed to Congress to strengthen further the
existing provisions of Section 102."7 Accordingly, in the 1938 Act, an
42. According to Elmer Irey, Chief of the Intelligence Unit of the Internal Revenue
Bureau, 585 personal holding companies had been formed by Americans in Bahama
Islands, Nassau, Panama, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island. See Hearings,
supra note 34, at 38.
43. See Report of Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 20-21.
44. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, SEx. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1918) 5.
45. National Grocery Co. v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 163 (1936), rev/d, 92 F. (2d) 931
(C. C. A. 3d, 1937), ultimately aff'd, 304 U. S. 282 (1938).
46. Cecil B. DeMille v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 1161 (1935), aff'd, 90 F. (2d) 12 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 713 (1937).
47. The Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee in its report, supra note
43, at 20-26, had recommended and a majority of the committee itself had approved a
so-called "third basket" provision whereby closely held companies not falling within the
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attempt was made to comply with the Department's request: Congress
retained the provision that the fact that a company is a mere holding
or investment company is prima facie evidence of the intention to escape
the surtax;4 but it substituted for the corresponding provision with
respect to unreasonable accumulation of earnings a new subsection (c)
reading as follows:
"Evidence Determinative of Purpose. The fact that the earnings
or profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the
reasonable needs of the business, shall be determinative of the pur-
pose to avoid surtax upon shareholders unless the corporation by the
clear preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary."
The meaning of the new language, taken by itself, is far from being
crystal clear. It imposes on the accused corporation the burden of proving
by the clear preponderance of evidence that the accumulatiun of profits,
if unreasonable, was not for the purpose of avoiding surtax on the share-
holders.49 But was not the corporation already faced with this burden?
Every finding of the Commissioner, except fraud and transferee lia-
bility,"0 is presumed to be correct, and the taxpayer is under the burden
of overcoming this presumption. The Treasury Department's complaint
that it found difficulty in proving the condemned purpose was not wholly
justified. The burden of proof has always been on the taxpayer. not on
the Government.5" In this connection, it may be noted that in the National
Grocery Company case, the Government had no witnesses; it merely
offered in evidence the tax returns and accounts of the taxpayer cor-
poration and its sole shareholder. The grocery company on the other
hand, adduced extensive testimony not only by its sole stockholder and
its officers, but also by accountants, bankers and others. Yet the Govern-
ment won the case.
personal holding company classification would have been subjected to a special surta.x on
their undistributed profits. This proposal never passed the House.
48. The words "or investment" (company] were added by the 1924 Act.
49. The necessity for the change is also somewhat problematical. After the 1933
Act was passed, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court of appeals' decision in the
National Grocery Co. case and restored the decision of the Board, so that the incident
which was probably chiefly responsible for the amendment -anished.
It has been held that the corporation must prove a complete absence of the forbidden
purpose. See note 74 infra.
50. Under the rules of the Board (Rule 32), the Commissioner is also charged with
the burden of proof in respect of any new matter pleaded in his answer. This rule stood
the taxpayer corporation in good stead in Dill Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 1023
(1938), where the Commissioner asserted the application of § 102 in his answer rather
than in the deficiency letter.
51. See Sherman, Taxation of Corporations Used to Avoid Taxes Upon Stocho:old-
ers (1935) 13 TAx MAG. 19, 46.
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Despite the inherent obscurity of the new provision, the legislative
history of the 1938 Act52 indicates that by it, Congress intended to
strengthen the presumption of prohibited purpose where earnings have
been allowed to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business
and to increase the burden of proof on the taxpayer where such a situa-
tion exists.53 The Treasury Department so interprets the change in the
Law,54 and its construction is likely to receive judicial sanction. With the
elimination of the undistributed profits surtax (except for a straggling
remnant), the rates of Section 102 surtax (for all corporations subject
to the section) were restored to 25% and 35%. The other changes in
Section 102 made by the 1938 Act were not important, the principal one
being the elimination of the provision permitting exemption from the
penalty tax if all the shareholders included their pro rata shares of the
retained net income in their individual returns. This provision was elim-
inated for the reason that the 1938 Act permits the deduction of "consent
dividends" (as defined in Section 28) in computing the income subject
to the penalty tax.
6. Present provisions. The present provisions represent the crystal-
lization of twenty-five years of effort to prevent the utilization of cor-
porations as a device to escape surtaxes.
55
Now the tax under Section 102, 25% on the first $100,000 and 35%
on the remainder, is measured by the undistributed Section 102 net
income. This is computed by deducting from the statutory net income,
without the benefit of the net loss carryover allowed by Section 23(s),
the following:
1. Federal income tax other than the tax imposed by Section 102 or
a corresponding provision of the prior law;
2. Disallowed charitable contributions;
3. Capital losses disallowed because of the $2,000 limitation con-
tained in Section 117(d) ;56
4. Dividends paid ;57
5. Consent dividends (as provided by Section 28);
52. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, SEN. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 4-5, 16.
53. Cf. comment of the Ways and Means Committee in its report on the 1939 Act to
the effect that if the 1938 amendment "fails to accomplish the purposes intended, further
effort will be made to correct the situation in the near future." Report of the Committee
o; Ways and Means, H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 6.
54. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 102-2.
55. This section is applicable to foreign as well as domestic corporations; but a foreign
corporation deriving income from United States sources, whether resident or nonresident,
is not subject to Section 102 if all of its shareholders are nonresident aliens who would
not be subject to surtax on distributions made by the corporation. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101,
Art. 102-1.
56. Deductions 1, 2 and 3 were first allowed by the 1936 Act.
57. This deduction was first allowed by the 1934 Act.
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6. Operating loss of the preceding year subject to certain limita-
tions ;rs
7. A special credit in the case of bank affiliates.
The last four items are included in the basic surtax credit allowed by
Section 27(b).
The computation of the tax on personal holding companies will be
discussed under subsequent headings.
III. APPLICATION OF SECTION 102
To date there have been thirty-three decisions directly involving the
application of Section 102 or its ancestors."O Of these cases, the Govern-
ment has won eighteen. But even this insubstantial superiority, so far
as the present Section 102 is concerned, disappears when it is considered
that in thirteen of the Government's victories as against nine of its
defeats, the taxpayer corporation was one which would now be classed
as a personal holding company, and so outside the pale of Section 102.
Analysis of these thirty-three cases produces the conclusion that there
is no single factor, whether it be the size of the accumulation, the per-
centage of income paid out as dividends, the existence of loans to stock-
holders, or financial condition which can be set up as an infallible
barometer of liability under Section 102. For every situation which has
been seized upon as a reason for holding one company taxable, it will
be found that there is another case where the same situation existed,
but where the decision was in favor of the taxpayer. Indeed, some factors,
such as loans by a shareholder to his corporation, seem to be revolving
weather vanes, sometimes pointing to liability and sometimes away from it.
While the decisions have not delineated any absolutely safe channel
to steer clear of the rocks of Section 102, short of distributing all the
income, the Treasury Department has very recently taken upon itself
to set up some aids to navigation, 60 classifying five corporate situations
58. In computing the "Section 102 net income," the two-year net operating loss de-
duction provided in Section 23 (s) and Section 122 (added by the 1939 Act) is not al-
lowed. Ix-r. REV. CODE § 102 (d) (1). But in determining the "undistributed Section 102
net income" which measures the penalty tax, the one-year net loss carryover provided in
Section 26(c) - which is computed somewhat differently from the carryover allowed
by Section 23 (s)-is an allowable deduction by virtue of being included in the basic
surtax credit allowed by Section 27 (b).
59. These cases are listed in Appendix infra pp. 221-223. Cases indirectly involing
§102 or its predecessors: Kales v. Woodworth, 32 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929);
French Mtge. & Bond Co. v. Woodworth, 3S F. (2d) 841 (E. D. Mich. 1930) (the latter
held that an injunction will not lie to prevent collection of tax assessed under the penalty
section); and Stem v. Comm'r, 11 B.T.A. 1309 (1928), holding that a shareholder
may not deduct his proportionate share of the corporation loss in his individual return
by virtue of the provisions of the section.
60. T. D. 4914, INT. REv. BuL. No. 31, at 8 (1939).
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which will be given close attention to determine whether Section 102 is
applicable."'
While the cases fail to produce absolutely dependable guideposts to
culpability or innocence, they do establish certain rules of law. However,
before passing to the discussion of these rules, it should be emphasized
that the ultimate question is one of fact--was the taxpayer corporation
formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of
surtax upon its shareholders through the medium of accumulating its
earnings? When the problem is one of fact, there are hardly two cases
which are exactly alike. This explains in part why the results have been
different in cases where the factual situation was similar. It also explains
why an appeal from the Board or court of original jurisdiction in a
Section 102 case is virtually useless. In all of the cases which have been
appealed thus far, every one of the original decisions was ultimately
su'stained." The closest to a reversal was in the National Grocery Com-
pany case where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the Board by a divided court and was itself reversed by a divided
Supreme Court.
A. RULES OF LAW ESTABLISHED BY DECISIONS
1. Constitutionality. The validity of the penalty provisions of Section
102 was first upheld in the United Business Corporation13 and Williams
Investment Company0 4 cases, and was finally sustained by the Supreme
61. The five classes of corporations referred to are: (1) Corporations which have
not distributed at least 70 per cent of their earnings as taxable dividends; (2) Corpora-
tions which have invested earnings in securities or other properties unrelated to their
normal business activities; (3) Corporations which have advanced supis to officers or
shareholders in the form of loans out of undistributed profits or surplus from which tax-
able dividends might have been declared; (4) Corporations, a majority of whose stock is
held by a family group or other small group of individuals, or by a trust or trusts for the
benefit of such groups; (5) Corporations the distributions of which, while exceeding 70
per cent of their earnings, appear to be inadequate when considered in connection with
the nature of the business or the financial position of the corporation or corporations with
accumulations of cash or other quick assets which appear to be beyond the reasonable
needs of the business. T. D. 4914, INT. REv. BULL. No. 31, at 8 (1939).
62. Fifteen cases were appealed up to November 1, 1939. Of the eighteen cases won
by the Government, fifteen were decided by the Board, two by district courts, and one by
the Court of Claims. Of the fifteen cases in which the taxpayer was victorious, twelve
were decided by the Board and three by district courts.
63. United Business Corp. v. Comm'r, 19 B.T.A. 809 (1930), aff'd, 62 F. (2d) 754
(C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 635 (1933). The same company was again
held taxable for a later year in United Business Corp. of America v. Comm'r, 33 B.T.A.
83 (1935). Wherever "the United Business Corporation case" is referred to herein, the
first case is intended unless otherwise noted.
64. Williams Investment Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 225 (Ct. Cl. 1933).
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Court in the National Grocery Company case." The argument against
constitutionality before the Supreme Court was five pointed.
First, it was argued that the Statute violated the Tenth Amendment
because it interfered with the power of a corporation to declare or with-
hold dividends, and thus impinged on a state function. The answer to
this was fairly obvious: the Statute does not enforce the declaration
of a dividend; it merely imposes a tax on corporations which use their
power to withhold dividends for the purpose of preventing the imposition
of federal surtaxes upon their shareholders."" Second, it was argued that
the Statute was invalid because it imposed not an income tax but a penalty
designed to force corporations to distribute their earnings so that their
stockholders might be taxed. This argument was rejected, Justice Brandeis
saying that Kohl, the sole owner of the business, could not by conducting
it as a corporation prevent Congress, if it chose to do so, from taxing
him individually on the year's profits."7 The third argument that the
section was invalid because liability was imposed through mere purpo se to
prevent surtaxes, rather than upon the accomplishment of that purpose,
was also rejected. The Court held that while the existence of the pur-
pose is a condition precedent to the imposition of the tax, the tax is
nevertheless a true income tax, pointing out that there are many instances
in which purpose or state of mind determines the incidence of income tax;
for example, the imposition of the fraud penalty or whether a payment
is received as compensation or as a gift."8
Fourth, it was contended that the Statute was depriving the corporation
of its property without due process of law because it was unreasonable.
arbitrary and capricious in that no standard or formula is specified as
a guide for avoiding the tax. The Court, however, held that the standard
was a rational one, quoting the language of judge Learned Hand in the
United Business Corporation case to the effect that it was no more capri-
cious to require a reasonable accumulation of earnings than it would be
65. See note 45 supra.
66. Cf. statement by judge Green quoted infra note 67.
67. This is in direct conflict with the language of the majority opinion in Eisner v.
Macomber, supra note 13; and is hardly a convincing answer as the tax imposed upon
the corporation by the section bears no relationship to ,vhat the tax against the share-
holders would be. A more cogent reply would have been the statement in the concurring
opinion of Judge Green in Williams Investment Co., note 64: " . . . Assuming for the
purposes of the argument only that it is a penalty, it would appear to be immaterial in the
case now under consideration for the reason that Congress has power to impose a penalty
for evading taxes or assisting or furthering the evasion thereof. Penalties are imposed for
a violation of a statute or regulation." However, where a penalty for defeating taxes is
involved, the burden of proof is on the Government.
68. This reasoning is again unconvincing and the examples are not apt as the impo-
sition of the fraud penalty connotes accomplishment of purpose and the "compensation-
gift" character of a payment involves only the imposition of the ordinary tax rather
than a penalty tax.
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to require reasonable standards of prudence in driving an automobile,
or reasonable care in similar tort situations."0 The court also brushed
aside the argument that the section was unfair to non-assenting minority
shareholders who have no control over corporate distributions,"° stating
that this objection need not be considered as there were no minority share-
holders. Finally, the argument that the section was void because it dele-
gated to the Commissioner legislative power was rejected, since the Statute
does not confer upon the Commissioner any power save that of finding
facts upon evidence.
2. Purpose the Touchstone. The cases clearly establish the principle
that the touchstone of liability is the purpose behind the accumulation of
the income and not the consequences of the accumulation." The Board
in the Cecil De Mille case stated this aptly, as follows:
"The tax under section 102 is not imposed because of effects:
avoidance per se is not prohibited. It is the purpose, the intention,
motivating the course of conduct which is made controlling by the
statute. Unless the purpose was to prevent the imposition of surtax,
the tax may not be imposed." 72
Once it is found that the company was availed of for the purpose of
preventing the imposition of surtax by accumulating its income, it does
not matter whether any tax was saved, or whether the company was an
investment or holding company or some other kind of company, or
whether its accumulation was reasonable or unreasonable.73 If those in
control of the corporation are guilty of the condemned purpose, the cor-
poration is enmeshed by Section 102; and this is true even where there
are other motives for accumulation, and the avoidance of surtax is not
the dominant motive. In other words, there must be "a complete absence
of the disapproved purpose." ''
69. See also Judge Green's concurring opinion in Williams Investment Co. v. United
States, 3 F. Supp. 225, 236 (Ct. Cl. 1933).
70. Cf. the Kales case supra note 18. See discussion infra pp. 210-211, as to constitu-
tionality of taxing shareholders on their proportionate shares of the corporation's undis-
tributed income.
71. But the consequences are considered in determining whether the purpose was pres.
ent. See pp. 193-194 infra.
72. See note 46 supra.
73. Until 1921, the Treasury Department in its regulations and rulings had mis-
construed the Statute by stating that the application of the section depended upon tbo
elements: "(a) purpose to escape the surtax and (b) unreasonable accumulation of,
gains and profits." The regulations were changed to reflect the correct construction that
purpose alone is the ultimate test of liability. The present regulation is contained in
Art. 102-2. See Sherman, Taxation of Corporations Used to Avoid Taxes Upon Stock-
holders (1935) 13 TAX MAG. 19, 25-26.
74. Member Sternhagen in R. L. Blaffer & Co. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 851, 856 (1938),
aff'd, 103 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939), cert. denied, U. S. Sup. Ct. No. 169 (Oct.
1939).
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3. Effect of Statutory Presumptions. In almost any income tax con-
troversy - the notable exception being that of fraud - the Commissioner
is aided by a presumption: his finding is prima facie correct, and the
taxpayer is faced with the burden of overcoming that presumption.
A finding by the Commissioner that Section 102 is applicable neces-
sarily includes a finding that the attainted purpose is present. But purpose
is a frame of mind7" and since the Commissioner cannot peer into the
minds"7 of those who control the corporation, Congress thought it desir-
able to strengthen the general presumption in favor of the Commissioner's
finding by statutory provisions which impute guilt to a corporation if
it is a mere holding company or investment company, or if it has per-
mitted an unreasonable accumulation of earnings or profits. Congress
in the 1938 Act went even further and strengthened, or at least attempted
to strengthen, the presumption of proscribed purpose where there has
been an unreasonable accumulation of earnings. The effect of these pre-
sumptions is that the taxpayer is required to show his hand,' s and, of
course, if the disclosure of that hand reveals the prohibited purpose,
Section 102 applies. In other words, the corporation is faced with the
burden of showing what actually motivated the accumulation.
4. What is a mere holding or investment coninpany? Undoubtedly, a
corporation which passively holds property, whether it be real estate or
other tangible property, or securities, and which simply collects the income
and pays expenses, is a "mere holding or investment company." But
suppose the corporation does more than this; suppose it actively engages
in speculative trading on a large scale. Can it then still be a mere holding
or investment company? The Board had an opportunity to answer this
question in Rands, Incorporated v. Commissioner,m but dodged it, holding
that the prohibited purpose was so clearly present that the company was
taxable regardless of whether it was a mere investment or holding com-
pany." The Board did indicate that a company formed to engage in
speculation and intended to derive its incom6 mainly from profits on the
sale of securities is an investment or holding company, but refrained from
a discussion of the effect to be given to the word "mere."8" On the
75. See p. 179 and note 50 supra. Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 102-.
76. Sherman, Taxation of Corporations Used to Avoid Taxes Upon Slochholdcrs
(1935) 13 TA-X MAG. 19, 26.
77. DeMille Productions, Inc. v. Comim'r, 30 B.T.A. 826, 829 (1934), petition for
review dismissed,. 80 F. (2d) 1010 (1936).
78. United Business Corp. v. Comm'r, 62 F. (2d) 754, 755 (1933).
79. 34 B.T.A. 1094 (1936), appeal disinisscd, 101 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
80. 34 B.T.A. 1094, 1103 (1936) ; cf. Almours Securities, Inc. v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A.
61, 74 (1936).
81. The Regulations likewise avoid any discussion of the meaning of "mere." U. S.
Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 102-2. Perhaps this is intended to imply that the Department does
not consider the term significant. However, such a position would hardly he warranted
in view of the Statute.
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other hand, in Industrial Bankers Securities Corporation v. Higgins,"
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit approved an auditor's
report which held that the word "mere" must be given effect and that a
corporation which owned the stocks of subsidiary small loan companies
and apparently controlled the activities of such subsidiaries in an active
manner, while a holding company, was not a "mere" holding company.
5. What is an unreasonable accumulation of earnings or profits? No
answer to this question can be given that would be applicable to corpora-
tions generally. The results in the decided cases show plainly that each
case rests on its own footing with respect to the amount of earnings that
may reasonably be accumulated, and that no hard and fast rule can be
evolved."3 Nevertheless, certain principles have been established. For
instance, we know from the Supreme Court via the National Grocery
Company decision, that unrealized depreciation in the value of assets,
while taken into consideration in determining whether the accumulation
has been reasonable, does not preclude a finding of unreasonable accumu-
lation even if such decline is in excess of the accumulated earnings.
8 4
We can also conclude from the United Business Corporation case,8
that there may be taken into consideration, in testing the unreasonable-
ness of the accumulation: the possibility of operating losses ;8O the amount
82. 104 F. (2d) 177 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). This case is unique in that it is the only
Section 102 case that has been referred to an auditor. See also, Seaboard Security Co.
v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 560 (1938), where the court held that small loan companies were
not mere investment or holding companies.
83. The Treasury regulations on the subject of reasonableness consist necessarily
of generalizations and do not afford much help in establishing a line of demarcation
between a reasonable and an unreasonable accumulation. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art.
102-3. For a discussion of previous regulations and rulings on what constitutes a reason-
able accumulation, see Sherman, supra note 76, at 78-80, and Graubard, Accumulation of
Surplus to Evade Surtaxes (1932) 10 TAX MAG. 415. The regulations discussed in Sher-
man's article are substantially the same as the present regulations.
84. It can hardly be said that. this conclusion has any logic back of it. The average
stockholder would not consider that a corporation had unreasonably withheld a dividend
where the assets of the company had dropped in value to a degree sufficient to wipe out
the realized earnings. In fact, a director voting a dividend under such circumstances might
incur severe criticism. The condemned purpose may have been present in the National
Grocery Company case so that the imposition of the penalty tax was justifiable regard-
less of the existence of an unreasonable accumulation of the year's profits, but the finding
that there was such an accumulation is difficult to swallow. Cf. the Rands case in which
the Board had specifically found that there was an unreasonable accumulation in 1927
and 1928, but omitted a corresponding finding for 1929 anid 1930 because in the two
later years, the diminution in value of the assets had wiped out the realized gains.
85. 19 B.T.A. 809, 827, 828, 830, 838 (1930). Even though the corporation was held
taxable for one of the years involved, there was no finding that the accumulation was
unreasonable.
86. In the United Business Corporation case it was shown that the operation of the
real estate owned by the corporation had, in some of the past years, resulted in losses.
But the possibility of speculative losses is apparently of no great consequence. Cf. Rands,
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of money needed for operating expenses ;87 and the existence of bona
fides8 mortgage indebtedness requiring annual amortization.
The amount required for expansion purposes based on past experience
is apparently another factor in measuring reasonableness. Thus, in the
National Grocery Company case, where the number of stores in the chain
had grown from 358 to 815 during a period of ten years, and Kohl, the
sole stockholder, had testified that each store required a capital of about
$5,000, the Supreme Court reckoned that this rate of e-x-pansion could
have accounted for an accumulation of only $2,285,000 as contrasted
with the actual accumulation during that period of about,$5,742,000.
The statutory provision with respect to the effect of an unreasonable
accumulation contains the phrase "needs of the business.'"s It therefore
becomes necessary to inquire into the meaning of the corporation's "busi-
ness." In R. C. Tway Sales Company v. United States"' the Government
argued that the reasonable needs of the corporate business should be
determined only by reference to the necessities of the business authorized
by the company's charter, to wit, the coal business; and that the accumu-
lation of profits from transactions in securities, not authorized by the
charter, was unreasonable because not needed for the authorized business.
But the Court rejected this argument, pointing out that the Government,
by seeking to impose the penalty tax on the income from the ultra vires
securities business, had virtually conceded that the securities transactions
were part of the company's business; and it followed that the reasonable-
ness of the accumulation was measureable by the needs of that business
as well as by the requirements of the coal business.,'
Mere ownership by one corporation of the stock and securities of
another corporation does not make the business of the second corpora-
Inc. v. Comm'r, 34 B.T.A. 1094 (1936); R. L. Blaffer & Co. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 851
(1938), aff'd, 103 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939), cert. denied, U. S. Sup. Ct. No. 169
(Oct. 1939) ; Nipoch Corp. v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 662 (1937).
87. In the United Business Corporation case, the income accumulated was not in ex-
cess of a single year's operating expenses. Cf. the National Grocery Company case where
the rent and payroll for a year amounted to about '$4,000,000 contrasted with an accumu-
lation of $8,000,000.
88. Indebtedness incurred with the idea of legitimizing accumulations would probably
react to the disadvantage of the taxpayer. See p. 198 et seq. infra for discussion of
this point. In the United Business Corporation case there was a mortgage on the cor-
poration's real estate requiring serial payments of $50,000 per year on account of prin-
cipal.
89. Section 102 (c).
90. 3 F. Supp. 668 (IV. D. Ky. 1933), aff'd, 75 F. (2d) 336 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935).
91. Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 102-3, which provides: "The business of a cor-
poration is not merely that which it has previously carried on, but includes in general any
line of business which it may undertake. However, a radical change of business xhen a
considerable surplus has been accumulated may afford evidence of a purpose to avoid
the surtax."
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tion the business of the first. 92 But the result is different where the other
corporation is a wholly or substantially wholly owned subsidiary of the
first corporation. 3
6. The meaning of "earnings or profits." According to the Board in
W. S. Farish & Co. v. Commissioner," "earnings or profits" mean the
same thing in Section 102 that they do in Section 115 relating to divi-
dends." Consequently, realized losses on sales of property, even though
not allowed for ordinary income tax purposes, are deductible in com-
puting "earnings or profits." In the Farish case, Farish organized the
corporation and transferred to it in exchange for its stock - the exchange
being tax-free9"- securities which had cost him about $800,000, but
which had a value at the time of transfer of about $1,200,000. For
ordinary income tax purposes, the basis for computing gain or loss on
the sale of securities would be their cost to Farish and not their cost to
the corporation. But the Board held that Section 102 refers not to an
accumulation of taxable net income, but to an accumulation of earnings
or profits, and that earnings or profits are measured by the cost of assets
to the corporation rather than to the transferor. The Board had reached
a similar conclusion with respect to the dividend status of corporate
distributionsY
7. Section not applicable to avoidance of tax by some other method
than accumulation of earnings. The Farish case establishes another im-
portant principle: it holds that a corporation formed to prevent the
imposition of taxes in some other way than by accumulation of earnings
does not come within Section 102. Shortly after the organization of
Farish's company, he sold securities to it and established large losses on
such sales. Under the law as it then stood, such losses were deductible.,"
The Government argued that Farish organized the company for the pur-
pose of realizing these losses and thus avoiding tax, and that it was, there-
92. Keck Investment Co. v. Comm'r, 29 B.T.A. 143 (1933), aff'd, 77 F. (2d) 244
(C. C. A. 9th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 633 (1935). The taxpayer corporation had
argued that the accumulation was needed to finance another company. The report of the
case does not show what percentage of the second company's stock was owned by the
taxpayer corporation.
93. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art, 102-3; Industrial Bankers Securities Corp. v. Hig-
gins, 104 F. (2d) 177 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
94. 38 B.T.A. 150 (1938), aff'd, 104 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
95. This conclusion is fortified by the comment of the Senate Finance Committee in
its report on the 1936 Act, which changed the word "gains" to "earnings." Report of MIe
Senate Committee on Finance, SEN. REP. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 17.
96. Under § 112(b) (5).
97. McKinney v. Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 450 (1935), aff'd, 87 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A.
10th, 1937); Freshman v. Comm'r, 33 B.T.A. 394 (1935); and F. J. Young Corp. v.
Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 860 (1937), aff'd, 103 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
98. Under current law, such losses would not be allowable. INT. RE V. Coo: § 24 (b).
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fore, within the ambit of Section 102; but the Board held that, assuming
the existence of this purpose, Section 102 was nevertheless inapplicable.
8. Illegality of dividend declaration. The fact that the declaration of
a dividend would be illegal under state law is not, according to existing
decisions, sufficient of itself to save the corporation from Section 102."
9. Res judicata. It has been held1 0 that a decision holding a company
subject to the section for one year is not res judicata as to another year.10'
There are dicta in the Board cases to the effect that if a corporation is
formed for the disapproved purpose, the section is applicable regardless
of whether or not it was availed of during the taxable year for that
purpose.10 2 However, this is dicta and in the cases which have been won
by the Government, it has been uniformly held that the corporation was
formed and availed of for the proscribed purpose or else availed of for
that purpose.
B. ANALYSIS OF CASES BY REFERENCE TO CIRCUMSTANTIAL FACTORS
The attempt, by an analysis of the cases, to arrive at factors which can
be used as definitive guides in determining whether Section 102 is appli-
cable to a particular situation has not proved altogether fruitless, for it
is at least possible to indicate certain tendencies or trends.
1. Nature of company. A manufacturing or mercantile company is
certainly less likely to be ensnared by Section 102 than other types of
corporations. But even aside from the type of corporation, the fact that
it is in the process of liquidation does not relieve it from the application
of Section 102.113 Of the decided cases, six involved mercantile or
manufacturing corporations, and of these the Government won only one
-the National Grocery case -and even in that one the victory was
by the barest possible margin.104 On the other hand, of five decided
99. See p. 195 infra.
100. United Business Corp. v. Comm'r, 33 B.T.A. 83 (1935). See note 63 supra.
101. In Charleston Lumber Co. v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 83, 90 (S. D. V.
Va. 1937), petition for rezie,, dismissed, 93 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), the court
inferred that the guilt of a company in prior years-presumably outlawed by the statute
of limitations-is no ground for liability in a year for which the taint was not present.
But the failure of the company to distribute its earnings in prior years will undoubtedly
have an effect on the determination of liability for a later year. Cf. National Grocery
Co. v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 163 (1936), and Almours Securities, Inc. v. Comm'r, 35
B.T.A. 61 (1936), aff'd, 91 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), ccri. denied, 302 U. S.
765 (1938).
102. E.g., Nipoch Corp. v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 662 (1937), and cases cited on p. CGS
of opinion.
103. 0. D. 838, 5 Cum. BuLL 226 (1921).
104. Cf. Dill MAfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 1023, 1031 (193S). "... where
the petitioner is not a holding company but is engaged in a manufacturing business, which
is so obviously hazardous from a business viewpoint, we will hesitate before substituting
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cases involving companies which were neither mercantile companies nor
companies which would now be classed as personal holding companies,
the Government lost only one.
2. Percentage of income distributed during the taxable year. This
factor is, of course, evidentiary, but it is apparently not of primary im-
portance. Thus, in the cases decided in the Government's favor, the aver-
age amount of income distributed during the taxable year was slightly
more than 7%, the highest being 55% in the Almours08 case; whereas
in the cases decided against the Government, the average amount of
income distributed was about the same, to wit, 7%, the highest being
36%. However, the Treasury Department now takes the view that a com-
pany which distributes less than 70% of its earnings invites scrutiny."'
Dividends paid in years other than the taxable year are also taken into
consideration. Thus, in the Alviours case, while 55% was'paid out during
one of the taxable years, the aggregate amount paid out over a period
of six years was only about 20%. The Almours company had declared
huge stock dividends, but these were non-taxable to its shareholders tinder
the law in force at the time of declaration, and had little effect on the
company's liability for the penalty tax.
0 7
The earlier Regulations had provided that a distribution of a large
portion of the year's earnings might overcome the statutory presumption
that a mere holding or investment company is subject to the penalty
section,' but this was changed in 1934 and the Regulations now provide
that the distribution of a large portion of the year's earnings is not of
itself sufficient to override the presumption. 100
3. Existence of loans to shareholders. Substantial loans to share-
holders were present in eight of the Government's eighteen victories; on
the other hand, there were substantial advances to stockholders in five of
the cases lost by the Government. As to loans to stockholders, however,
it may safely be said that in every case decided against the taxpayer in
which such loans were present, they were an important factor in the
ultimate result."0 Thus, in the National Grocery Company case, the fact
that Kohl, the sole shareholder, borrowed substantial sums from the
corporation, and during the taxable year had borrowed $140,000 for his
our judgment upon the reasonableness of the corporate accumulations, for that of the
directors."
105. Almours Securities, Inc. v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 61 (1936).
106. See notes 60 and 61 supra.
107. Cf. Sol. Op. 144, 1-2 Cumi. BULL. 4 (1922), holding that the distribution of a
non-taxable stock dividend does not deplete earnings or profits.
108. E.g., U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 542.
109. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 102-2.
110. Cf. notes 60 and 61 (3) supra.
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personal purposes,"' was in all probability the turning point of the case
against him, so far as the Board was concerned. Similarly, in the United
Business Corporation case, the loans to Smith, the sole stockholder,
emasculated his argument that the accumulated earnings were needed for
the purposes of the business. Again in the William De Mille case 12 the
loans to him were undoubtedly the deciding factor, in fact the only one
which distinguished it from his brother Cecil's case.' Loans were also
an important factor in A. D. Sacnger, Inc. ,. Commissioner,"4 and in the
Dill Manufacturing Company case" 3 the Board pointed to the absence
of loans in deciding the case in the taxpayer's favor. In some of the
cases, notably National Grocery Company, some emphasis was placed
on the fact that the loans to the shareholders were made without interest.
It is difficult to see, however, why this should operate against the tax-
payer, since the payment of such interest will generally effect a greater
reduction in the stockholder's individual tax- such interest being an
allowable deduction - than the increase in the corporation's tax burden.
4. Mon-interest bearing loans by shareholders. In Rands, Incorporated
v. Commissioner"6 and Reynard Corporation v. ComMissioner,IT the
sole stockholder in each case urged that his case was distinguishable from
other cases decided against the taxpayer, because in such other cases there
were loans to stockholders, whereas in the Rands and Reynard cases the
corporations were indebted to Rands and Fox respectively. Instead of
bolstering the taxpayer's case, this argument proved to be a boomerang
and was turned against him. The Board pointed out that the loans, being
without interest and the funds being used by the corporation to purchase
income-producing securities, would effect a further escape of surtax, since
if the individual had invested in the securities himself, he would have
had to pay individual tax on the income from such securities at higher
rates than the corporation paid. On the other hand. in Meilbani: Corpora-
tion v. Commissioner,n s the fact that the corporation's owner lent it
large sums to enable it to tide over the banks it owned during a period
of banking difficulties was accepted in support of the taxpayer's position
that the accumulation of earnings was not unreasonable. And in Sau.
111. Of this sum, Kohl used $40,000 to purchase a residence in Florida and made a
$100,000 charitable contribution.
112. See note 77 supra.
113. See note 46 supra.
114. 33 B.T.A. 135 (1935), aff'd, 84 F. (2d) 23 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cert. dcrucd,
299 U. S. 578 (1936).
115. See note 50 supra.
116. See note 79 supra.
117. 37 B.T.A. 552 (1938), petition for review dismissed, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) (un-
reported).
118. 38 B.T.A. 1108 (1938).
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Investment Company v. Commissioner,"" advances by the stockholders
to the corporation to enable it to meet interest and principal payments on
account of the purchase price of its chief asset, were helpful in sustaining
the taxpayer's argument that it was not in a position to declare dividends.
5. Nature of income. The fact that the greater part of the income
received by the corporation is such as would be subject to tax when
received by an individual, but would be wholly or largely tax-exempt
when received by a corporation, to wit, intercorporate dividends and
federal bond interest,'20 has weighed heavily against the taxpayer in some
cases, notably United Business Corporation,' Williams Investment Com-
pany, 2 2 Saenger,123 and Almours.124 In fact, in fifteen of the eighteen
cases won by the Government, dividends constituted the major item of
income. On the other hand, in about one-half of the fifteen cases won
by the taxpayer, dividend income was also substantial.
6. Unrealized declines in the value of assets. This has already been
discussed to some extent in connection with the meaning of "unreasonable
accumulation." Such declines were not sufficient to save the corporation
in the Rands, Nipoch,'25 R. & L., 26 Almours, Saenger, National Grocery
Company and Blaffer127 cases. On the other hand, they were responsible
for the taxpayer winning in C. H. Spitzner & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner.'2 8
The Board distinguished the Spitzner case from the Rands and Nipoch
cases on the ground that the Spitzner corporation was a mercantile com-
pany, and that the decline in the value of assets of such a company should
be given more weight than in the case of an investment or holding com-
pany. This distinction loses most of its significance in the light of the
National Grocery Company case, which also involved a mercantile com-
pany with unrealized declines in asset values. The Spitzner case was
decided after the circuit court of appeals had reversed the Board decision
in the National Grocery Company case and before the Supreme Court
reversed the circuit court.'
20
119. 34 B.T.A. 732 (1936).
120. Income excluded from gross income, such as state or municipal bond interest,
or the exempt proceeds of a life insurance policy, does not measure the penalty tax, but
being part of "earnings or profits," it presumably has a bearing on the determination of
whether the accumulation of other income is reasonable.
121. See note 63 supra.
122. See note 64 supra.
123. See note 114 supra.
124. See note 101 supra.
125. See note 86 supra.
126. R. & L., Inc. v. Comm'r, 33 B.T.A. 857 (1935), aff'd, 84 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A.
5th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 588 (1936).
127. R. L. Blaffer & Co. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 851 (1938), aff'd, 103 F. (2d) 487
(C. C. A. 5th, 1939), cert. denied, U. S. Sup. Ct. No. 169 (Oct. 1939).
128. 37 B.T.A. 511 (1938).
129. See the last sentence of the majority opinion in the Spitzuer case, 37 B.T.A.
511, 523 (1938). However, the Spitaner Company's case might be distinguished from the
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7. Change in policy. A sudden shift in corporate or individual policy
may be indicative of an attempt to achieve the condemned purpose.'"
Thus, in the United Business Corporation case, the company started out
as a pure real estate operating company, 3" but later Smith, the sole stock-
holder, transferred to it large blocks of dividend-paying stocks. Had
Smith received the dividends from these stocks, he would have incurred
substantial individual surtax liability. Smith's corporation, on the other
hand, received the dividends tax-free.132 In the National Grocery Com-
pany case, the company had started to pay dividends in 1917 and 1918,
but stopped after the high rates of surtax were enacted in 1919.133 In
the Williams Investment Company case, Neiman, the controlling stock-
holder, who theretofore had received relatively modest dividends from
a newspaper company, organized the investment company and transferred
to it the stock of the newspaper company shortly before the declaration
by the latter of an extraordinarily large dividend.134 On the other hand,
in the Tway Sales Cornpany case, 133 the fact that the company, v'hich
had originally confined its activities to the coal business, went outside the
limits of its charter and engaged in securities speculation to such an
extent that its income from the latter during the taxable year far ex-
ceeded the income from the coal business, did not bring down upon it
the visitation of the accumulation penalty.
S. Effect of accumulation on taxes of shareholders. The amount of
tax saved by the individual stockholders as a result of non-distribution
is undoubtedly a vital factor. While avoidance per se is not prohibited,"-
such avoidance is taken into consideration in determining whether the
interdicted purpose is present. The fact that the stockholders of the cor-
A atfonal Grocery Company case on the ground that a substantial portion of its invest-
ments were in securities of tobacco companies with which it did business, i.e., the in-
vestments were germane to the business of the company, whereas in the Nrational Gro-
cery Company case the investments were in the securities of banhs, railroads, utilities
and other companies whose business was not related to that of the grocery company.
See p. 200 infra.
130. Cf. note 91 supra.
131. The majority opinion in the Unitcd Business Corporation case indicated that if
the company had confined its business to its buildings, that it would not have fallen within
the provisions of Section 220 of the Revenue Act of 1921, 19 B.T.A. S09, 823 (1930).
132. Such intercorporate dividends under the 1921 Act were even free from the penalty
tax, due to a loophole which was eliminated by the 1924 Act. Cf. Keck Investment Co. v.
Comm'r, 29 B.T.A. 143 (1933), aff'd, 77 F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), cert. dcricd,
296 U. S. 633 (1935).
133. Cf. United Business Corp. -. Comm'r, 62 F. (2d) 754, 755 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
"A sudden change of policy, coincident with large increases in the surtax rates, might
. . . betray a purpose to accumulate against a season more propitious for distributions."
134. This dividend would have been taxable had Neiman received it directly, but it
was not taxable when received by his corporation.
135. See note 90 supra.
136. See p. 184 supra.
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poration have saved large amounts of tax has undoubtedly weighed
against it. For example, in the National Grocery Company case, Kohl
saved more than $1,300,000 in surtax over a ten-year period. Few of the
reports in cases won by the Government indicate just how much tax the
stockholders escaped as a result of non-distribution. However, it may be
taken for granted that in each such case the saving was substantial. But
where, as in the Charleston Lumber Company case"37 and in two other
cases, namely, Irvington Investment Company v. Commissioner,3 8 and
Rofam, Inc. v. Commissioner,'" it was shown that the amount of tax
on the shareholders would have been trivial even if the corporation had
distributed its entire earnings, the decision was in favor of the taxpayer. 110
Directors of companies generally know when they are skirting the
fringes of liability under Section 102, and in determining dividend policies,
weigh the possible penalty against the individual tax saved by non-dis-
tribution. If the controlling stockholder of a company within the scope
of Section 102 is already in tax brackets beyond 25% 141 and is content
to forego receipt of the corporate income until distribution can be effected
without burdensome individual tax liability, the corporation can accumu-
late $100,000 without effective financial penalty. And once the controlling
stockholder's income passes the 35% bracket, unlimited accumulation is
possible without penalty other than the opprobrium 141 of being charged
with tax avoidance. Where this situation exists, the evidence to overcome
the charge of liability should have to be particularly convincing. On the
other hand, as the cases indicate, the less the individual saving resulting
from accumulation, the milder will be the threat of chastisement under
the section.
9. Financial condition of the company. This has been an important
factor in some cases. Thus, in the National Grocery Company case, the
fact that the company had more than $1,000,000 in cash in excess of its
liabilities was pointed to as negativing the argument that it needed the
137. See note 101 supra.
138. 32 B.T.A. 1165 (1935).
139. Memo. B.T.A. Docket No. 81,597, April 17, 1937.
140. Seaboard Security Company v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 560 (1938) (involving small
loan companies).
141. The 25% bracket is reached when net income after deducting exemptions equals
$32,000; the 35% bracket is reached at $50,000. Neither is a particularly forbidding
figure.
142. Cf. GII.BRT AND SULLIVAN, RUDDIGORE (1887) Act II: "Sir Ruthven: On Tues-
day I made a false income tax return.
All: Hal Hal
1st Ghost: That's nothing.
2d Ghost: Nothing at all.
3d Ghost: Everybody does that.
4th Ghost: It's expected of you."
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accumulation in its business.143 But, in Sauk Investment Company v.
Conniissioner,4 4 and in Miellbank Corporation,45 the fact that the com-
pany was always short of cash and had no cash with which to pay a
dividend, (there being no loans to shareholders) was cited as a point in
its favor. In the Sank case, the reason the company never had any sub-
stantial amount of cash was that the dividends received by it were largely
in the form of bonds."4 6 In the efcllbank case, the income was used to
tide over banks owned by the Mellbank Corporation during a period of
banking difficulties. In the Saenger case 47 the company's argument that
it had no cash with which to pay a dividend lost all of its force in view of
loans to its shareholder. And in R. & L., Incorporated,48 the Board
pointed out that the alleged shortage of cash resulted from reinvestment
of the current income rather than from any exigency of the business.
In the Tway Sales Company case, 4  decided in the taxpayer's favor,
some importance was apparently attached to the fact that the company's
current asset and liability ratio was less than two to one, the require-
ment of the Federal Reserve Board for rediscounting commercial paper.
10. Illegality of dividend declaration.""' In the Spit-imer case,'"' the
company's assets (largely securities) had depreciated in value to an extent
sufficient to wipe out its surplus. The company followed the consistent
practice of writing its securities up or down to end-of-year market values
and by so doing for the taxable year, reduced its book surplus to practi-
cally zero. The company's attorney advised it that the declaration of a
dividend in such circumstances would be illegal under local (New York)
law. The illegality of a dividend declaration probably decided the Spitmier
case in the taxpayer's favor. Yet, very shortly thereafter, the majority
of the Board, in the R. L. Blaffcr & Company - case, held the corporation
subject to the penalty tax even though the declaration of a dividend would
have been clearly illegal under local law (Texas) because of a decline
in the value of the corporation's assets (almost entirely securities) which
not only wiped out its surplus but its capital as well. In other words, the
company was insolvent, its liabilities far exceeding the value of its as-
sets. '5 The liabilities, however, consisted entirely of stock brokerage
143. See notes 60 and 61 (5) supra.
144. See note 119 supra.
145. See note 118 supra.
146. The point that the Sauk company might have distributed the bonds as a dividend
in kind does not appear to have been suggested, so far as the case report indicates.
147. See note 114 supra.
148. See note 126 supra.
149. See note 90 supra.
150. This factor is mentioned briefly at p. 189 mspra.
151. See note 128 supra.
152. See note 127 supra.
153. In Rands case (for one of the later years) and in the Nipoels case (both of
which were decided against the taxpayer) the decline in asset values was sufficient to
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accounts guaranteed by Blaffer individually. The Board rejected the plea
of insolvency as an excuse for non-distribution of the realized income,
and rationalized its conclusion as follows:
"Insolvency was a mathematical abstraction, for the creditors were
fully secured by Blaffer's individual guaranty and Blaffer had ample
assets to assure it. Even article 1347 of the Texas Civil Statutes,
which petitioner cites, would go no farther than to make the direc-
tors jointly and severally liable for the corporation's debts, to the
extent of the dividend; and such liability Blaffer had already assumed
by his guaranty."' 54
Conceding the peculiar factual situation in the Blaffer case, the Board's
reasoning is, nevertheless, specious. To say the insolvency was "mathe-
matical abstraction" because Blaffer, who was wealthy, was a guarantor
of the corporation's debts, completely overlooks the fact that Blaffer was
not the sole stockholder,"" and that the declaration of a dividend would
have depleted the assets which the creditors could look to for satisfaction
of their claims.J 0 Moreover, no mention seems to be made of the possible
criminal liability which might result from the declaration of a dividend
in the face of known insolvency. Nevertheless, the circuit court of appeals
affirmed the Board's decision and the Supreme Court has just denied
certiorari.
11. Incorporated talents cases. These are sui generis. The imponder-
able factor of credibility of witnesses was probably largely responsible
for the result in each case. Of the four cases, two involved motion picture
directors, the brothers De Mille ;167 the other two involved cartoonists,
"Bud" Fisher" 8 and Fontaine Fox.' The De Mille brothers advanced as
the reason for the accumulation by their corporations that they were
wipe out the surplus but not the capital. However, no point seems to have been made
in these cases of the illegality of a dividend declaration. On the other hand, the question
was raised in the R. & L. case and Saenger case, but the Board pointed out that the
companies involved had surpluses, even allowing for the depreciated values of their
assets, and hence were not prevented by the local law (La.) from making distributions.
154. The Board's opinion included a dictum to the effect that a rise in the market
value of the company's securities would not have been significant in discovering the
applicability of Section 104. This does not appear to be sound. Suppose a corporation
has a modest accumulation of current income and tremendous unrealized gains, Why
should not the latter be considered in measuring reasonableness or ascertaining purpose?
155. Blaffer's wife owned almost half the stock.
156. The assets would have been depleted to the extent the dividend was payable to
others than Blaffer and to the extent that Blaffer individually might have become in-
solvent.
157. See notes 77 and 46 supra.
158. Fisher & Fisher, Inc. v. Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 211 (1935), aff'd per curian, 84 F.
(2d) 996 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
159. Reynard Corp. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 552 (1938), petition for review dismissed,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938) (unreported).
[Vol. 49: /171
1939] SECTION 102 OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 197
building up surplus to a point where they could achieve independent pic-
ture production instead of relying on the major companies to finance their
productions.' 0 The Board upheld Cecil, but William lost his case. Al-
though William started out on the straight and narrow path - the Board
held that his company was not liable for 1924 and 1925 -he strayed
from it in 1926, when, in connection with a divorce from his then wife,
he borrowed large amounts from the corporation in order to settle with
her. The corporation's advances to William De Mille proved to be the
turning point against him. It was held that when he borrowed a large
amount from the corporation for personal purposes, he abandoned' his
original purpose and his company was held liable for the years 1926,
1927 and 1928.
The Fisher and the Fox cases are more difficult to reconcile than the
De Mille cases. The principal reason advanced for accumulation in each
case was that the corporation was building up surplus so that it would
have capital with which to effect distribution of its own comic strips in
case the syndicates through which distribution was normally effected
should fail, or refuse to renew the distribution contracts. Each also ad-
vanced the argument that it would be necessary to accumulate money with
which to finance the production of animated cartoon movies. The Board
evidently believed the story told on Fisher's behalf, but found Fox's story
less persuasive.
161
12. Income used to pay off obligations. Another interesting series of
cases in which the personal element has apparently played an important
part consists of Sauk, 2 1cad,'03 Rofam' and Beim.=0 In each of
these cases, the corporation acquired assets (stock of another company)
and assumed obligations in connection with the acquisition of these assets.
The income was used to pay off the obligations. In the Sauk and Rofam
cases, the Board believed the testimony that the corporations were organ-
160. In the National Groccry Company case, Kohl had argued that he was obsessed
with the idea of expansion-of adding more stores to his chain-and that the accumu-
lation was to finance such expansion and fulfill his ambition. The Supreme Court an-
swered that since Kohl was the sole owner of the company, his purpose could have been
achieved through distribution and individual reinvestment of the corporate earnings
(depleted, of course, by individual tax) as well as through accumulation of the corporate
earnings. As a general proposition, this reasoning is decidedly tenuous-it overloo!s the
fact that the stockholder and his corporation are separate entities and that the legitimate
purposes of each may not coincide-but it could equally be applied to the DeMille cases.
It is conceivable that if Cecil's case had been decided after the Supreme Court decision
in National Grocery Company his corporation would have met the same fate as his
brother's.
161. It is interesting to note that the same attorney counseled both Fox and Fisher.
162. See note 119 supra.
163. 'Mead Corp. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 687. See note 20 supra.
164. See note 139 supra.
165. Beim Co. v. Landy, D. 3,finn., Sept. 19, 1939.
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ized for legitimate purposes and that the accumulation of income was
incidental." 6 On the other hand, in the Mead case, Mead's contention
that he had not formed his corporation for the prohibited purpose was
weakened by the fact that he also formed another corporation, which
held the stock of the first, at a time when it was thought by many that
the provisions of Section 102 could be successfully dodged by the inter-
position of a second corporation between the stockholder and the first
corporation. 67 Aside from the element of credibility, there is little to
distinguish the Beirn case from the Sauk decision. A case related to these
four cases is Dill Manufacturing Company1 38 where preferred stock had
been issued to minority common stockholders in part payment for their
common, and the accumulated earnings were thereafter used in part to
buy in such preferred stock. 6' The company was held not taxable, the
Board stating that the preferred stock, which had to be retired within
five years, was in the nature of a debt.
Presumably, the indebtedness which is paid off with the accumulated
income must be bona fide, i.e., it must not be incurred with the idea of
using it as a shield against the application of Section 102. Any other
interpretation would make evasion of the section easy. For example,
if an individual owning unencumbered real estate worth $1,000,000
transfers it to a wholly owned corporation which issues to him $100,000
of stock and a purchase money mortgage of $900,000, the use of the
income to make principal payments on the mortgage should rather con-
clusively indicate the presence of the condemned purpose.
One writer 170 advocates the proposition that "the accumulation of
corporate profits to discharge a mortgage debt, incurred prior' 7 1 to the
acquisition of the mortgaged assets by the corporation, is not such a
reasonable accumulation as to excuse the payment of taxes thereon by
the stockholders, or by the corporation for them . . ." He argues that
a "contrary holding would open the door to a simple method of tax
evasion," and suggests an example in which an individual organizes a
166. The Rofam case was probably strengthened by the fact that distribution of its
income would not have resulted in any appreciable tax to the shareholders. But the
Board did not comment on this point.
167. See note 20 supra.
168. See note 50 supra.
169. Cf. Williams Investment Co. case, 3 F. Supp. 225 (Ct. Cl. 1933), in which the
reason advanced for accumulation was a desire on the part of the controlling stockholder
to acquire the minority stock in another corporation-a newspaper company. (The tax-
payer corporation already held a majority interest in the newspaper company). The
court stated that this was a private purpose of the controlling shareholder rather than
a corporate purpose.
170. Graubard, loc. cit. supra note 83.
171. The significance of the time of incurring the debt is not clear. Logically, there
is little distinction between investing accumulated income in new property and using it
to pay off incumbrances on old property.
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corporation to which he transfers $100,000 with which the corporation
buys apartment houses of a value of $1,000,000 with mortgage encum-
brances, presumably held by outsiders, to the extent of $900,000 due in
twenty years. The corporation does not declare any dividends but accumu-
lates its income against the day when the mortgage matures.'- 2 "All
objective tests of determining intent in such a case," it is said, "fall down,
once it is conceded that an accumulation need only be made for a reason-
able business [purpose?] to be outside the scope of the statute." This
argument, however, overlooks the fact that the ultimate test of liability
under Section 102 is not the reasonableness of the accumulation but the
presence of the condemned purpose; and if, in the case suggested, the
surrounding circumstances indicated the existence of the proscribed mo-
tive, the mortgage liability would not save the corporation from the
penalty tax. The courts have not experienced insuperable difficulty in
finding the interdicted purpose even where the accumulation of income
was not unreasonableYr3
Another writer, 74 commenting on the provision in the Regulations' 75
that "undistributed income is properly accumulated if . . . in accor-
dance with contract obligations placed to the credit of a sinking fund for
the purpose of retiring bonds issued by the corporation" suggests that it
affords "a facile mode of escape from the application of the statute." He
goes on to point out that:
"In England, after five years of experience with a statute similar
in many ways to ours, the law was amended so as to exclude from
the scope of 'reasonable needs of the business' the withholding of
corporate profits for the purpose of (1) payment for the business,
undertaking or property which the company was formed to acquire
or which was the first business undertaking or property of a sub-
stantial character in fact acquired by the company; or (2) repayment
of any share, loan or debt incurred on account of such purchase; or
(3) meeting any obligations, incidental to such purchase, otherwise
than in pursuance of an obligation entered into before August 4,
1914; and (4) payments made on account of any fictitious or arti-
ficial transaction."' 
76
Aside from the fact that under the English law, liability turns solely on
the reasonableness of the accumulation rather than on purpose, 7 7 the
provision mentioned in the above quotation is perhaps justified because
capital gains under British law are not taxable and the increase in the
172. Sherman, supra note 51, n. 69.
173. E.g., United Business Corp., Rands, Inc., Nipoch, Blaffer cases, etc.
174. Sherman, loc. cit. supra note 51.
175. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 102-3.
176. See also CAROLL, TAXATION OF BUSI-T'ESS In GR&AT Braumi (published by the
Dep't of Commerce in 1928 as Trade Promotion Series, No. 60) 72-74.
177. See note 297 and pp. 218-219 infra.
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stockholders' equity resulting from application of the accumulated earn-
ings to the payment of corporate indebtedness of the kind mentioned
would otherwise completely escape tax even when realized on a disposi-
tion of the stock. At any rate the existence of an analogous provision in
our law would undoubtedly hamper borrowing for legitimate corporate
expansion, and it is doubtful whether such a provision would be neces-
sary or even justifiable.
13. The closeness of the corporation. While this has never been men-
tioned in any of the cases, it is undoubtedly a factor. In almost all the
cases involving Section 102 or its forebears, the corporation was owned
either by a single stockholder or by a controlling stockholder and the
members of his immediate family. Normally, the greater the number of
stockholders, and the wider the distribution of the stock, the less will be
the incentive to withhold dividends in order to achieve the condemned
purpose.
Up to 1934, the Regulations stated that the statutory presumption ap-
plicable to a mere holding or investment company could be overcome by
showing that the "stock was held not by members of a family or of a
small group but by a large number of persons and in comparatively small
blocks. ' ' " Presumably this provision was designed to allay the fears of
legitimate publicly owned investment trusts. However, the Regulations
were changed in 19341' and the provision was eliminated.
14. Form in which accumulated earnings are invested. The Regula-
tions contain the statement: "The nature of the investment of earnings
or profits is immaterial if they are not in fact needed in the business." 180
Nevertheless, in at least three cases the form in which the accumulated
earnings were invested was a factor. Thus, in the National Grocery Com-
pany case, the fact that they were largely invested in the stocks and bonds
of banks, public utilities, railroads, etc., having no direct or indirect
relationship to the grocery business, was apparently given weight.18'
However, in the Spitzner case,182 the fact that they were invested to a sub-
stantial degree in securities of tobacco companies, with which the Spitzner
company did business, and in Charleston Lumber Company,183 that they
were invested in local real estate and securities of local companies, the
Charleston company being engaged in the building materials business,
178. U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 542.
179. T. D. 4470, XIII-2 Cum. BuLL. 151 (1934).
180. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 102-3. This is, of course, correct in so far as it affects
the question of reasonableness. If the accumulation is in fact unreasonable, the form It
takes can have no bearing on the applicability of the statutory presumption.
181. Cf. Industrial Bankers Securities Corp. v. Higgins, 104 F. (2d) 177 (C. C. A.
2d, 1939), involving a financing company, where temporary investments in stocks of un-
related companies did not prevent a finding in the company's favor.
182. See note 128 supra.
183. See note 101 supra.
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was apparently given weight in deciding the case favorably to the tax-
payer.
Reinvestment of the earnings in additional productive plant and equip-
ment should, of course, be a conclusive answer to any charge of unreason-
able accumulation."8 4
15. Effect (under prior Acts) of shareholders reporting corporate
income. One other problem remains to be considered before leaving
Section 102. It involves a situation that would not arise under current
law, but might arise under Acts prior to the 1938 Act. Mellon, et al,
Executors v. Commissioner8 5 posed the question. There Richard Mellon
had included in his 1930 individual return, pursuant to subdivision (d)
of the penalty section as it stood prior to the 1938 Act,'80 what he thought
was the entire undistributed income of the Mellbank corporation, the same
corporation which was held not taxable for 1932 in the Meilbauk case.18'
The Government adjusted the income of the Mellbank corporation for
1930 and took the position that since Mellon who owned all of the com-
pany's stock had elected to report the undistributed income, he would be
required, upon adjustment of that income, to include the increased amount.
Mellon's executors, on the other hand, claimed a refund on the amount
which had already been reported, claiming that the company was not
guilty of the condemned purpose in 1930. The Board upheld the execu-
tors, and allowed the refund, stating that since the interdicted purpose
was not present, Mellon had no right to elect under subdivision (d) to
report any part of the undistributed income. The result in the MIellon
case may be correct, but the Board's reasoning is specious. The Board
said: "To hold otherwise would be to permit the shareholders of any
corporation to choose the year in which they desired to be taxed on
their distributive shares of the corporate earnings, whether distributed
or not." But did not the shareholders already have this option, since the
declaration of a dividend and its reinvestment is ordinarily within their
choice? However, a more appealing argument would have been that since
Mellon had not included all of the corporation's income in his individual
return, he had not relieved his company from liability under the penalty
section, and hence should not be bound by his election.' 88
184. Cf. Dill Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939) and J. E. Baker Co. v.
Comnm'r, Memo. B.T.A. Docket No. 87,758, June 6, 1939.
185. 38 B.T.A. 1259 (1938).
186. The provision referred to is no longer in the law. See p. 180 supra.
187. See note 118 supra.
188. But cf. Clay v. Conun'r, 40 B.T.A. No. 88 (1939); Gardiner v. Welch, 17 A.
F.T.R. 1047, 1937-1 Cum. BuL.L. 256 (S. D. Cal. 1936), in which the shareholders
included their proportionate distributive shares of the corporation's income in their in-
dividual returns and then sued to recover the resulting ta on the grounds that the guilty
purpose was not present. The court denied recovery and held further that the proscribkd
purpose was present.
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IV. PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANIES GENERALLY
The personal holding company, as a creature of income tax law, was
first born in 1934 when Congress tardily recognized that Section 102
was not a particularly effective contraceptive. In casting about for methods
of reaching accumulated corporate income, the legislators accepted the
suggestion that personal holding companies be placed in a separate cate-
gory and be subjected to a special surtax on their undistributed income
-such surtax to be in addition to the normal corporation tax and to be
imposed regardless of the reason for non-distribution. It was soon dis-
covered that the original rates180 were too low to be fully effective and
in 1935 they were raised;"'° but these increased rates never became oper-
ative as they were only applicable to years beginning after December 31,
1935, and were superseded by the 1936 Act. The 1936 Act lowered the
1935 rates because of the co-existence of the undistributed profits tax,
1 1
but did not otherwise make any changes of vital importance to the
personal holding company provisions. However in 1937, Congress dis-
covered that the burdens of existence as a personal holding company,
even with the combined increased rates of surtax - undistributed profits
and personal holding company - provided for by the 1936 Act were
not quite so disagreeable as it had thought." 2 Furthermore, many of the
reprobate corporations at which the 1934-1936 provisions were aimed
found it not too difficult to wash off the scarlet letters by which they
were labeled and to assume the guise of respectable corporations."' Still
further it was found that incorporated talent corporations and foreign
corporations owned by Americans were successfully eluding not only the
personal holding company provisions, but Section 102 as well. The dis-
closure in 1937 of these infirmities of the law during the Hearings before
the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance resulted in the
corrective legislation discussed hereinafter, including the separate classi-
fication of "foreign" personal holding companies and the imposition of
189. The rates under the 1934 Act were: 30% on the first $100,000, and 40% on the
remainder of the undistributed net income.
190. Except that the lowest bracket was lowered; the rates under the 1935 amendment
to the 1934 Act-the amendment, as stated in the text, never became operative-were:
20% on the first $2,000 of undistributed adjusted net income; 30o on the next $98,000;
40% on the next $400,000; 50% on the next $500,000; and 60% on the balance.
191. The rates of personal holding company surtax under the 1936 Act were exactly
12% less in each bracket than the rates given in the preceding footnote.
192. Even under the combined surtaxes of the 1936 Act, it was possible by the use
of multiple personal holding companies with sufficiently small incomes to put them into
lower brackets to avoid tax. Report of the Ways and Means Comniniltee, H. R. Rzv. No.
1546 (1937) 3. However, the provisions of the 1934 and 1936 Acts were not nearly
so ineffective as some of their critics intimated. See p. 176 supra.
193. See pp. 175-176 supra.
194. See pp. 177-178 mtpra.
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a 75% surtax on undistributed adjusted net income (65% on the first
$2,000) against other personal holding companies.
The 1938 Act made no significant changes with regard to personal
holding companies. The 1939 Act denies them the benefit of the capital
loss provisions which will be available to other corporations beginning
with 1940.1"' It also' denies them the benefit of the two-year net loss
carryover, but apparently it still permits them to deduct, in computing
the income subject to surtax, or taxable to the shareholders, the one-
year loss carryover allowed by Section 26(c). °
Of course, all personal holding companies were not conceived in sin
- many were organized for legitimate personal or business reasons; but
Congress has made little distinction between the goats and the sheep.
Moreover, some of the victims are being spanked much more vigorously
than they, and perhaps Congress, anticipated - and without regard to
the heinousness of past tax obliquities. For instance, consider the case
of a domestic personal holding company which has taxable income but
has neither accumulated earnings or profits'9 8 of past years'"0 (after
February 28, 1913), nor earnings or profits of the taxable year. This
situation will arise where the corporation has non-deductible capital losses
or other non-allowable expenses or losses which more than offset the
current income. Under existing law such a corporation will perforce
be subject to a 75% surtax on its net income (65% on the first $2,000).
It cannot escape this tax, because even if it makes a distribution to its
shareholders equal to its taxable net income, that distribution, not being
out of earnings or profits of either the taxable or past years, is not a
"dividend" within the meaning of Section 115(a) and hence cannot
constitute any part of the dividends paid credit allowed by Section 27.213
The tax cannot be avoided even if all the stockholders, under the consent
dividend provisions of Section 28(f), elect to include their proportionate
shares of the corporation's taxable net income in their individual returns,
because under subdivision (c) of Section 28 the corporation may include
195. REvENuE Acr OF 1939, § 212 (a), amending § 117 of the Code.
196. RENuE AcT OF 1939, § 211 (b), adding § 122 to the Code.
197. This carryover which is allowed by virtue of being included in the basic surtax
credit, § 27 (b), is computed somewhat differently from that allowed by § 23 (s). See
note 58 supra.
198. Taxable income is not, of course, synonymous with "earnings or profits:' See
U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 115-3; PAUL AXDI MERTEzS. LAw OF FED.rERL INCMoM TAXA-
TION (1934) I 8A0 et seq.
199. The accumulated earnings of a predecessor corporation, acquired by the suc-
cessor corporation in a tax-free reorganization will be considered earnings of the suc-
cessor in determining the dividend status of distributions by the latter. Acee Corp. v.
Comm'r, Memo. B.T.A. Docket No. 93,368, Sept. 30, 1939.
200. Section 27 (i) provides that a distribution which is not a taxable dividend is not
to be included in the basic surtax credit. A distribution is not a taxable dividend unless
made out of earnings or profits of either the current or past years. § 115 (a).
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in its basic surtax credit only so much of the consent dividend as it
would have been entitled to include had it made actual distribution in
cash.20 ' As a consequence, a corporation unfortunate enough to find
itself in this position is enclosed in a straight jacket from which no one
but Congress or the courts can extricate it.
That scant help is to be expected from the courts is foreshadowed by
the decision in Foley Securities Company v. Commissioner.2 In that
case, which involved Section 351 of the 1934 Act, a personal holding
company distributed approximately $42,000 to its stockholders in 1934.
Its net earnings during the taxable year amounted to about $49,000; but
due to the fact that the company had an operating deficit of about $23,000
at the beginning of the year, its accumulated earnings amounted to only
about $26,000, and hence only that amount was treated as a taxable
dividend. °8 The Commissioner ruled tlat in computing the undistributed
income which measured the tax imposed by Section 351, the credit allowed
by subdivision (b) (2) (C) of that section for dividends paid during the
year, referred only to a dividend within the definition of that term con-
tained in Section 115; and that accordingly there could be deducted only
that part of the dividend which was out of accumulated earnings and
hence taxable to the stockholders. The Board, in sustaining the Com-
missioner, interpreted the intention of Congress as follows:204 "The
purpose of Section 351 [now Section 500 of the Code] was apparently
to subject all the income of personal holding companies to surtax either
in the hands of the stockholders or in the hands of the corporations
themselves."
2 °5
As a general proposition, this seems to be sound enough, especially
where, as under the 1934 Act, the stockholders can save the corporation
201. Report of the Ways and Means Committee, H. R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 24-25. Note also § 504(a) which specifically excludes from the divi-
dends paid credit for personal holding company surtax purposes, the deficit credit allowed
in § 27 (a) (3).
202. 38 B.T.A. 1036 (1938), aff'd, C. C. A. 8th, Oct. 11, 1939.
203. Under the 1936 and subsequent Acts-§ 115 (a) -"dividend" is defined to mean
a distribution out of (1) earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or
(2) earnings or profits of the taxable year without regard to the amount of accumulated
earnings or profits. But clause (2) was not contained in the 1934 Act (or earlier Acts),
and consequently even though the Foley company had earnings of the taxable year
($49,000), its distribution was only a taxable dividend to the extent of the accumulated
earnings ($26,000).
204. 38 B.T.A. 1036, at 1037 (1938).
205. The Board virtually repeated this in Gaston & Co. v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 640
(1939) (also involving § 351 of the 1934 Act), and held that a distribution in liquidation,
not being taxable to the shareholders (unless in excess of basis), was not an allowable
dividend credit in computing the personal holding company surtax. But under current
law, a credit would apparently be allowed with respect to liquidating distributions under
certain circumstances. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 27 (g)-l; also I. T. 3067, 1937-1
Cum. BULL. 91.
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from the surtax by including their proportionate shares of the corporate
net income in their individual returns. -" ' But under existing law, as
indicated above, this avenue of escape is not open to a corporation with-
out accumulated earnings or earnings of the taxable year: the 75%
surtax is automatically imposed."° An inescapable tax of this size im-
posed on only a limited class of taxpayers, whose existence is not vicious
per se, is so arbitrary and unreasonable, and comes so close to confisca-
tion, that serious question must exist as to its validity
00
The constitutional point in the Foley case was apparently not pressed
strenuously before the Board, although it was in the appellate court.
The Board contented itself with the observation that doubts as to the
validity of Section 351 of the 1934 Act had been set at rest by the
determination -in the National Grocery Company case- that Section
102 is valid. But this observation is not at all persuasive - the appellate
court did not even refer to it -as the tax imposed by Section 102 is a
penalty tax necessary to prevent evasion and applicable only when an
oblique purpose is present. However, the personal holding company sur-
tax, at least in the absence of an escape provision corresponding to Section
351 (d) of the 1934 Act, is imposed even in the face of the most innocent
motives. Strangely, neither the Board nor the appellate court in sus-
taining Section 351 of the 1934 Act mentioned the safety valve contained
in subdivision (d). Yet its presence suggested the strongest reason for
upholding the provision's validity. The court paid lip service to the
206. Section 351 (d) of the 1934 Act. A similar option was available under the 1936
Act. [§ 351 (d)] subject to the qualification that 90% or more of the adjusted net income
had to be reported in the returns of non-corporate taxpayers. In Clay v. Comm'r, '40
B.T.A. No. 88 (1939), it was held that where the sole stockholder of a personal holding
company had elected to be taxed under this section, the Commissioner could increase to
the correct amount, the amount she had reported. Cf. Mellon et al. v. Comm'r, 3S B.T.A.
1259 (1938).
207. Complete liquidation of such a company during the taxable year would probably
not avoid the prohibitively high surtax. In I. T. 3067, note 205 supra, it was ruled that a
corporation which liquidated completely in 1936 was entitled to a dividends paid credit
(for undistributed profits surtax purposes) equal to its earnings or profits for that year
notwithstanding the fact that it had no accumulated earnings. (The deficit at the begin-
ning of the year exceeded the earnings for the year). This ruling appears to go bhyond
the literal meaning of § 27 (g) and (i). At any rate, it is doubtful 'whether the ruling
would extent to a corporation with neither accumulated earnings nor earnings of the
taxable year.
208. It has been said that by the 1937 (Loophole) Law, Congress imposed a death
sentence against the use of personal holding companies as a tax-avoiding device. Paul,
The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937. op. cit. supra note 29, at 62; Sanford Corp.
v. Comm'r, C. C. A. 3d, Sept. 21, 1939. But this is not to say that Congress intended to
sound the death knell of personal holding companies. Such companies very often do serve
useful and legitimate purposes, and it is questionable whether the Federal Government
could validly use its taxing powers to legislate them out of existence. Cf. Dailey v.
Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
205
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well-established rule that a too literal interpretation of a statute will be
departed from where the intention of the law makers was clear and a
strict construction would defeat that intention, lead to absurd conse-
quences or entail great hardship,00 but refused to apply it, concluding
"that Section 351 must be taken to mean exactly what it says."
2 10
On the constitutional question, the court held that Section 351 violated
neither the Sixteenth nor the Fifth (due process) Amendments. Scarcely
any quarrel can be made with the conclusion that the tax in the Foley
case did not violate the Sixteenth Amendment: it was imposed on income,
not capital. But the determination with respect to the applicability of the
due process amendment does not appear to be on equally firm ground. The
court itself indicated that the ground was thin by pointing out that a
literal adherence to the Statute had the effect of placing personal holding
companies with an impairment of capital in a far worse position than
those without an impairment of capital, and this for no apparent reason.
Hence, despite actual distribution of the current income, the companies
"with the largest operating deficits were required to pay the largest stir-
taxes." '' Notwithstanding the illogic and unreasonableness of this result,
the court, relying in part on a dictum in the Social Security Tax case,
2 12
and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Heiner 7'. Donnan,218
concluded that Section 351 does not violate the Fifth Amendment.
The result in the Foley case would seem to be correct in the light of
the escape provision contained in subdivision (d) of Section 351 of the
1934 Act, although the court's reasoning would appear to better support
a contrary determination. However, as heretofore indicated, the elim-
ination of the escape mechanism raises doubts as to the validity of the
corresponding section of current law in so far as it affects companies
with no accumulated earnings and no taxable year earnings.
While some personal holding companies, like those in the situation
discussed above in connection with the Foley case, have turned out to be
209. An illustration much in point is the last sentence of U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art.
401-1, which excludes certain foreign corporations from the definition of "personal hold-
ing company." A literal construction of the Statute will not support this provision,
which was undoubtedly inserted to avoid absurd and harsh consequences. See pp.
214-215 infra.
210. No consideration appears to have been given to the point that the personal hold-
ing company surtax, being an outgrowth of § 102, was only intended to reach companies
which that section (prior to amendment) might encompass. The Foley company, having
no accumulated earnings or profits, would not have been subject to § 102.
211. Cf. Crane-Johnson Co. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 1355 (1938), aff'd, 105 F. (2d)
740 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), holding that the undistributed profits surtax as applied to a
deficit corporation prohibited by local (North Dakota) law from declaring a dividend,
was constitutional.
212. Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937). "There are, however,
limits to the power of Congress to create a fictitious status under the guise of supposed
necessity." Helvering v. City Bank Co., 296 U. S. 85, 92 (1935).
213. 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
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Frankensteins which are devouring their creators, personal holding com-
panies may not be entirely without their tax uses. For instance, they
may still be used to, in effect, convert a long term capital gain or loss into
a short term capital gain or loss, or vice versa; so that one kind of loss
could be offset against the other kind of gain, a procedure forbidden to
individuals. 14 To take a concrete example: an individual desires to realize
a $100,000 short term loss and a $100,000 long term gain. As an in-
dividual he cannot offset one against the other; but by transferring the
respective assets to a wholly owned corporation which then proceeds to
sell them, the offset is in effect accomplished. Or suppose an individual
owning all the stock of a foreign personal holding company transfers it
to an irrevocable trust of which he is the life beneficiary, the remainder
over to other persons. For trust accounting purposes the beneficiary is
entitled only to dividends actually paid by the corporation. Accordingly,
by paying half the corporation's income out in dividends and accumu-
lating the other half in the corporation so that the trustee of the trust
will pay the tax on the undistributed half, the income is chopped down
into two equal piles at a considerable saving in tax. However, there is
a possible flaw in this latter plan, as it may be held that it comes within
the provisions of Section 167, relating to trusts where the income is
accumulated for the benefit of the grantor.
It may also be possible to convert a cash sale of property into an
installment sale through the use of a personal holding company. The
Supreme Court will soon pass on this question, since it recently granted
certiorari in Griffiths v. Commissioner.
2 15
A. Foreign Personal Holding Companies
Before a company may be classified as a foreign personal holding
company, it must be a foreign corporation, i.c., it must be organized under
the laws of some foreign country and it must meet two tests, one kmown
as the gross income requirement, and the other known as the stock
ownership requirement.210
1. Gross icome test. This requirement is met if 60% or more of
the company's gross income2 17 for its taxable year consists of foreign
personal holding company income as that term is defined by the Statute.
M[oreover, in order to prevent circumvention of the Statute by manipu-
lation of the corporation's affairs so that its foreign personal holding
214. Section 117.
215. 103 F. (2d) 110 (1939), cert. grantcd. U. S. Sup. Ct. No. 49, Oct. 9, 1939.
216. Section 331 (a). The definition does not include a corporation exempt from
tax-ation under § 101, § 331 (b).
217. Gross income is not synonymous with gross receipts. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101,
Art. 331-2.
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company income will be just under the 60%, the Statute goes on to
provide that if once a company has fallen within the foreign personal
holding company category, it continues to be such even if its gross income
from foreign personal holding company sources drops to 50%, until either
three consecutive years have elapsed in each of which the foreign personal
holding company income constitutes less than 50% of the gross income,
or until a year occurs in which the stock ownership requirement is not
met. 218
2. Stock ownership test. The stock ownership requirement is met if
at some time during the taxable year more than 50% in value 19 of the
company's outstanding stock.. 0 is owned -in the sense that the word is
used in the Statute -by not more than five individuals who are citizens
or residents of the United States.22' In order to prevent escape from
the stock ownership requirements by the distribution of stock to members
of one's family or by the interposition of some other entity between the
stock and the real owner, the law provides that in applying the stock
ownership requirement an individual is deemed to own not only stock
which he actually or directly owns, but also stock which he indirectly or
constructively owns. 22 2 For this purpose an individual owns indirectly
a proportionate share of the stock owned directly or indirectly by a cor-
poration of which he is a shareholder, or by a partnership of which he
is a partner, or by an estate of which he is a beneficiary.223 He con-
structively owns stock owned directly or indirectly by a member of his
family or his partner; the term "family" being defined to embrace spouse,
ancestors, descendants and brothers and sisters, including half-brothers
and sisters. 24 He also constructively owns stock on which he has an
option.225 Securities such as bonds which are convertible into stock are
counted as stock according to certain elaborate rules.226
218. Section 331 (a) (1). If a foreign operating company owned by Americans is ab-
normally inactive for a particular year, it may unwittingly find itself an unintended vic-
tim of the foreign personal holding company provisions.
219. The Regulations [U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 331-3] state that the value "may
be determined upon the basis of the company's net worth, earning and dividend-paying
capacity, appreciation of assets, together with such other factors as have a bearing upon
the value of the stock." Where there is more than one class of stock outstanding, the
value of each class must be determined.
220. In Collateral Equities Trust v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 834 (1939), it was held that
outstanding stock includes stock subscribed and paid for but not evidenced by certificates,
and that local law controls the status of stock ownership. The petitioner was held not a
personal holding company.
221. Section 331 (a) (2).
222. Section 333.
223. Section 333 (a) (1).
224. Section 333 (a) (2).
225. Section 333 (a) (3).
226. These rules are set out in § 333 and U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 333 (a)-I to 7.
The rules as to constructive ownership and convertible securities, all of which are designed
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3. Foreign personal holding company income. Generally speaking,
foreign personal holding company income mr includes dividends,22s inter-
est,22 9 royalties, the taxable portion of annuitiesaso gains from the sale
or exchange of stock or securities (except in the case of dealers - as dis-
tinguished from traders - in stock or securities), gains from transactions
in commodity futures (except bona fide hedging transactions), income
from estates or trusts, income from personal service contracts of the type
involved in the incorporated talent cases,2' rent or other compensation
for the use of the corporation's property by its shareholders (to close up
the incorporated yacht or incorporated country estate loophole),12 and
rents, unless such rents, not counting amounts received from the share-
holders, constitute 50% or more of the gross income. This last provision
is intended to prevent bona fide real estate corporations from being caught
by the foreign personal holding company provisions. In the case of
personal service contracts and compensation for the use of the corpora-
tion's property by a shareholder, the income is not includible unless at
some time during the taxable year the shareholder in question owns direct-
ly, indirectly or constructively 25% or more in value of the company's
stock." 3 The Treasury Department apparently takes the position" that
gains on sales of property required to be included refer to the total of all
gains rather than to the gains less losses, i.e.,the net gain, and the statutory
language3 5 is broad enough to justify this construction. Thus a company
which has $100,000 of gains and $90,000 of losses on sales of property
will, in determining whether it meets the gross income test, include in
foreign personal holding income not $10,000 but $100,000.
4. Undistributed Supplement P net income taxed to shareholders.
Supplement P does not impose any tax on the corporation, although the
corporation is still subject to the regular corporate taxes on income from
to prevent evasion of the stock ovmership requirement, are only applicable if they operate
to make the company a foreign personal holding company. [§334 (a) (4)]. Othervise
they are not applicable, i.e., if, as a result of these rules, but not otherwise, the company
is taken out of the personal holding company classification, the rules do not apply.
227. Section 332.
228. This includes "dividends as defined in § 115 (a) and amounts acquired to he in-
cluded in income under Supplement P. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 332-1 (1).
229. In Elverson Corp. v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. No. 97 (1939) it was held that although
the excess of the value of collateral acquired on a note default over the cost of the notes
represented income, it was not "interest" income. This determination saved the taxpayer
more than half a million dollars in personal holding company surtax.
230. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 332-1.
231. See p. 177 suapa.
232. See p. 177 mipra.
233. Section 332 (f).
234. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 332-1.
235. Section 332 (b) and (c).
209
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United States sources.23 Instead, Section 337 requires each United States
shareholder2 7 in a foreign personal holding company on the last day
during its taxable year on which it was a foreign personal holding com-
pany, to include in his (or its) return as a dividend the amount which
would be received by him (or it) if the company on such last day dis-
tributed its entire undistributed Supplement P net income.
38 If the
company was not a foreign personal holding company for the entire
year, then only a proportionate part of the income is reported. For
example, suppose the company's taxable year is the calendar year and
that it ceases to be a foreign personal holding company on September
30, 1939; then the persons who are United States shareholders on Sep-
tember 30, 1939, must include in their 1939 returns nine-twelfths of the
company's income for 1939, regardless of whether that correctly measures
the income for the first nine months of the year or not. Section 334
contains provisions designed to prevent the use of a chain of foreign
corporations to evade application of the foreign personal holding com-
pany provisions. The Statute does not contain any provision whereby
shareholders of a foreign personal holding company may deduct their
proportionate shares of any net losses sustained by the corporation.
5. Constitutionality. Is this method of taxation valid? In Collector
v. Hubbard,"39 a similar method of taxation, applicable to corporations
generally, was sustained, but in Eisner v. Macomber,24 1 the majority
opinion indicated that the Hubbard case was overruled by Pollock 71.
Farmers Loan & Trust Company,241 which itself has probably been over-
ruled, at least in part, by recent decisions.2 42 On the other hand, Eisner
v. Macomber has been whittled down until about all that remains of it
is the rule that a dividend in common stock on common stock is consti-
tutionally exempt.2 4' And even if that question were presented anew,
236. These would depend on whether or not the corporation was resident or non-
resident. § 231.
237. This would include citizens or residents of the United States, domestic corpora-
tions, domestic partnerships, and estates or trusts (other than foreign estates or trusts).
§ 337 (a).
238. Each shareholder is entitled to a credit for normal tax purposes equal to his
proportionate share of the interest received by the company on federal obligations which
is exempt from normal tax. § 337 (c).
239. See note 14 supra.
240. See note 12 supra.
241. See note 14 supra.
242. The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity-state and federal-has certainly
been weakened considerably. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938); Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939). See Knollenberg, Book Review
(1939) 49 YALE L. J. 158.
243. The Treasury Regulations still contain the Court's definition of income: "In
general, income is the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,
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it is conceivable that the bare minority in the Maconiber case might be
a majority today. At any rate, in the National Grocery case, Mr. Justice
Brandeis, who wrote the minority opinion in the Maconber case, said in
so many words that Congress could, if it chose, tax the shareholder of a
corporation individually on the undivided profits of the corporation; so
that perhaps Collector v. Hubbard is good law today. There seems to be
small chance of the foreign personal holding company provisions being
upset on constitutional grounds.
In the National Grocery case a question crept in as to the validity of
taxing any minority shareholder on his proportion of the undistributed
profits of the corporation, since he has no control over the corporation
and cannot compel any distribution to himself. The court, however,
refused to pass on the question, since there were no minority stockholders
in the grocery company. As to minority stock in a corporation organized
after the Statute was enacted, no great difficulty, presents itself, for it
could be justly held that the stockholder acquired his stock with its
burdens.' But as to a bona fide minority stockholder in a corporation
organized before the Statute was passed, the question is not quite so
simple. Probably it will be held that since under Collector v,. Hubbard.
Congress always had the power to tax the shareholders on the income of
the corporation, 245 the minority shareholder acquired his stock subject
to the Congressional exercise of that privilege and therefore could not
invoke either the due process clause or the argument that the tax would
be on capital rather than income.
6. Computation of icome required to be included by shareholders.
The income which the shareholders must report in their individual returns
is termed the "undistributed Supplement P net income."2 0 In arriving
at this figure, the starting point is the net income2 7 computed as if the
corporation were a domestic corporation. All of its income and deductions
are included regardless of whether from or related to United States
provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital
assets.'
244. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156. 171 (1921).
245. Cf. Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 282 (1938), rc-'g, 92 F. (2d)
931 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937).
246. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 336-2, § 335 contains an illustration of the computa-
tion of "Supplement P net income" and "undistributed Supplement P net income."
247. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 336-1 defines "Supplement P net income" to mean
"the gross income as defined in § 334 less the deductions provided in § 23 . . ." Taken
literally, this would permit the deductions, such as losses on intrafamily stock sales, for-
bidden by § 24, a result surely not intended by the Treasury Department. The Statute
(§ 336) simply defines "Supplement P net income" as meaning "the net income" with
certain adjustments. This definition plainly contemplates the non-deductibility of the items
specified in § 24.
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sources,2 48 except that the two-year net operating loss carryover,240 the
net short term capital loss carryover, and the unlimited long term capital
loss deduction, all of which will, beginning with 1940, be allowed to
ordinary corporations, will not be available for Supplement P purposes.2 0
This net income is then adjusted by adding back certain non-allowable
items, principally 281 the excess of expenses22 and depreciation over income
from incorporated yachts and country estates (although this may be
allowable under certain circumstances)2 .. and deducting federal income
taxes (other than the penalty or personal holding company surtaxes) and
charitable contributions in excess of the 5% deduction allowed by Section
23(q) (subject to certain limitations) .24 The resulting figure is termed
the "Supplement P net income ;''2  and from it there are deducted in
determining the income taxable to the shareholders, dividends paid, ""
248. Sections 334 (a), 336. The corporation's share of the Supplement P net income
of another foreign personal holding company in which it is a stockholder must be in-
cluded in gross income under § 334 (b) and (c) both for determining its own Supple-
ment P net income and for determining whether the company meets the gross income
requirement.
249. The one-year net loss carryover provided for by § 26 (c) will apparently still be
allowable. See p. 203 supra.
250. Nor will they be available for personal holding company surtax purposes. Per-
sonal holding companies for purposes of computing the surtax or the income taxable to
the shareholders, will only be able to deduct capital losses, whether short or long term,
to the extent of the capital gains plus $2,000.
251. Minor non-allowable items are contributions to pension trusts otherwise allow-
able under § 23 (p) and taxes of a shareholder paid by the corporation otherwise allow-
able under § 23 (d). § 336 (b) (1).
252. This refers only to expenses allowable under § 23 (a). It does not include items
otherwise deductible, such as interest and taxes.
253. Section 336 (b) (2). The loss on such yachts and estates (and similar property)
will be allowed if it is established to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that (1) tile
rent or other compensation received for the use of the property was the highest obtain-
able, or if none was received, that none was obtainable, (2) the property was held in tile
course of a business carried on bona fide for profit, and (3) either that there was reason-
able expectation that the operation of the property would result in a profit, or that the
property was necessary to the conduct of the business. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 336-1
states that the burden of proof to sustain the deduction rests on the taxpayer and sets out
information required to be included in the shareholder's return where the loss is claimed.
The analogous provisions with respect to other personal holding companies are con-
tained in § 505 (b) and Art. 406-1.
254. The limitation is 15% of the company's net income before deducting contribu-
tions and the non-allowable items mentioned in the text and note 251 supra [§ 336 (b) 1,
and without the inclusion of the company's share of Supplement P income of another
foreign personal holding company required to be included under § 334 (b).
255. Section 336.
256. Presumably this would include only dividends within the meaning of § 115 (a).
See p. 203 supra.
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consent dividends,'s and the net operating loss of the prior year subject
to certain limitations.1
7. Effect on basis and on accumulated earnings of the company. In
order to prevent double taxation of the same income, the amount which
a shareholder is required to include in his return as his share of the
undistributed Supplement P net income is added to the basis of his stock.
It is treated as if he had received the dividend and had immediately
reinvested it in the corporation, 2" and for the purpose of determining
the status of subsequent distributions, such income is treated as a reduc-
tion of the accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation.2 "C
8. Special provision with respect to liquidation. In order that indi-
viduals who were alert enough to escape taxes by the use of foreign
personal holding companies in years before the present provisions were
enacted might not profit too much by their ingenuity, the Statute provides
that even in the event of a complete liquidation of such a company, 100%
of the gain must be included in income, no matter how long the stock
has been held. -0 ' Moreover, in the event of the death of a shareholder,
the basis for his stock can never be increased by enhancement of the value
thereof to the date of his death, and such basis must remain at the lower
of the decedent's basis or the value at the date of his death."-
9. Special statute of limitations. There is a special statute of limita-
tions provision with respect to shareholders of foreign personal holding
companies.- If they omit from their returns any amount properly
includible therein under Section 337, the statute of limitations with respect
to their returns is extended to seven years after the return is filed, instead
of the normal three-year period. Apparently, the Statute would be kept
open for the extended period even with respect to items not connected
with the foreign personal holding company. - 4
257. Query: Would consent dividends be deductible if there were no earnings or
profits? See p. 203 supra. If not, a literal construction of the Statute might result in
double taxation of the stockholders on the same income.
258. See note 197 supra.
259. Section 337 (f).
260. Section 337 (e).
261. Section 115 (c).
262. Section 113 (a) (5). Up to December 31, 1938, it w, as possible to liquidate a
foreign personal holding company and obtain the advantage of the low capital gain tax
rate, but in many cases advantage could not be taken of this provision either bcaue
the cost was still prohibitive, or else the individual involved did not have sufficient cash
with which to pay the tax, even allowing for the fact that under certain circumstances an
extension may be obtained for the payment of the resulting tax over a period of five years.
Sections 115(c), 56(c)(2) (1938).
263. Section 275 (d).
264. Directors and officers and shareholders are required by the Statute and regula-
tions to make periodical information returns. §§ 338 and 339. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art.
338 and 339.
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B. Other Personal Holding Companies
A personal holding company within the meaning of Subchapter A of
Chapter 2 of the Internal Revenue Code is a corporation, whether do-
mestic or foreign,26 which meets two requirements: the gross income
requirement and the stock ownership requirement. 6
1. Gross income test. The gross income requirement 267 is similar to
the corresponding requirement in the case of foreign personal holding
companies, 268 except that the percentages of personal holding company
income are 80% and 70% instead of 60% and 50%.
2. Stock ownership test. The stock ownership requirement26 is
similar to the foreign personal holding company stock ownership require-
ment 270 except that in the case of a personal holding company under
Subchapter A the test is met only if the requisite ownership exists at
some time during the last half of the taxable year (instead of any time
during the taxable year) and the requisite stock need not be owned by
residents or citizens of the United States.
3. Personal holding company income. The definition of personal
holding company income 211 is the same as that for foreign personal hold-
21ing company income, 72 with the following exceptions: (a) mineral,
oil and gas royalties are excluded if they constitute 50% or more of the
gross income and the deductions allowable to the corporation as business
expenses, other than salaries paid to stockholders, constitute 15% or more
of the gross income. (This is to exclude legitimate oil operating corn-
panies); (b) the term "rents" includes interest on debts owed to the
corporation representing the sale price of real estate held by the corpora-
tion primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its business.
This last provision was added by the 1938 Act and is intended to protect
legitimate real estate corporations during a period of real estate inactivity.
4. Foreign corporations. A foreign corporation may be a personal
holding company within the meaning of Section 501. There is thus
265. See p. 215 infra.
266. The item "personal holding company" does not include banks, life insurance
companies, surety companies, corporations exempt from taxation under § 101, foreign
personal holding companies of the type discussed in the preceding sections, and licensed
small loan companies which meet the specifications set out in § 501 (b). (The 1938 Act
was the first to exclude small loan companies). Railroad corporations filing a consoli-
dated return under § 141 are subject to the surtax if the parent corporation meets the
stock ownership requirement and the group meets the gross income requirement. Section
501(c).
267. Section 501 (a) (1).
268. See p. 207 szpra.
269. Section 501 (a) (2).
270. See p. 208 supra.
271. Section 502.
272. See p. 209 supra.
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created the anomalous "foreign-domestic" personal holding company -
organized under some non-American jurisdiction and controlled by non-
resident aliens. Supplement P, on the other hand, reaches a foreign
corporation only if it is controlled by United States citizens or residents.
"While there are perfectly good reasons for including foreign corporations
as personal holding companies under Subchapter A of Chapter 2,2 a
literal application of the Statute sometimes produces absurd results. For
instance, suppose a foreign corporation having five or less shareholders,
all non-resident aliens, receives $2,000 in dividends from an American
corporation, and that this amount constitutes its entire income from
United States sources. Assume also that it has net income from non-
United States sources of $100,000, and that the bulk of the company's
gross income for three years past has been from sources outside the
United Stites. Even if such a corporation distributes its entire income
to its shareholders, such distribution will not be taxable income to the
shareholders under United States law. -74 Accordingly, such a dividend
will not be allowed as a deduction 70- in computing the undistributed Sub-
chapter A net income, and the $2,000 will be subject to a 65% tax. In
an attempt to avoid this result, the regulations contain a provision - to
the effect that a foreign corporation will not be treated as a personal
holding company if 50% or more of its gross income- 7 is derived out-
side the United States, and if all its stock during the last half of its
taxable year is owned, directly or indirectly, by non-resident aliens. While
there is no provision in the Statute that authorizes this regulation, it seems
reasonable and it is not likely to be challenged, since it is favorable to
the taxpayer.
5. Computation of tax. The undistributed net income which measures
the personal holding company surtax - the rates being 65% on the first
$2,000 and 75% on the remainder 278 is termed "undistributed Subchapter
A net income."279 It is computed in much the same fashion as the undis-
tributed Supplement P net income which the shareholders of a foreign
273. Otherwise nonresident alien individuals with extensive American holdings could
by transferring such holdings to a foreign corporation and accumulating the income
therein, escape the higher surtax brackets. Even if § 102 were applicable, the ma.imum
surtax would be 35%.
274. Section 119 (2) (B).
275. Section 27 (i).
276. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 401-1 (last sentence).
277. For the period specified in § 119 (a) (2) (B).
278. Section 500. These rates are in addition to the ordinary income tax and are
sufficiently high to practically force a personal holding company to distribute its income.
But note the dilemma of personal holding companies without accumulated earnings or
earnings of the taxable year. See pp. 202-204 su pra.
279. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 406-2, § 504, contains an illustration of the computa-
tion of "Subchapter A net income" and "undistributed Subchapter A net income."
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personal holding company are required to report in their returns.2 0 The
major differences2 ' consist of allowances for the two-year dividend
carryover provided by Section 27(c) ;182 amounts used or set aside to
retire indebtedness28 3 of any kind 28 4 incurred prior to January 1, 1934,
if such amounts are reasonable28 5 with reference to the size and terms
of the indebtedness ;280 and finally dividends paid within two and one-
half months after the close of the taxable year.2 87 The last mentioned
allowance 288 is optional, but is subject to certain limitations, the most
important of which is that the after-year dividends may not exceed 10%
of the dividends actually paid plus the consent dividends credit.280 There
is also a special credit29 known as deficiency dividends credit which is
280. See p. 211 supra, In the case of a "foreign-domestic" personal holding company,
the starting point would be net income from United States sources, rather than the
entire net income.
281. Minor differences are (1) the elimination of the adjustments referred to in note
251 supra; (2) a somewhat different computation of the 15% limitation on charitable
contributions [§ 505 (a) (2) ] ; and (3) the allowance of a special deduction for charitable
contributions in the case of certain corporations organized prior to January 1, 1936, to
take over the assets and liabilities of the estate of a decedent. § 505 (a) (3).
282. This deduction was first granted by the 1938 Act and is allowed by reference
from § 504 (a) to § 27 (a) (2). A 1939 amendment liberalizes somewhat the computa-
tion of this deduction.
283. The Treasury Department [Reg. 101, Art. 405-2(a)] has defined "indebtedness"
as "an obligation, absolute and not contingent, to pay, on demand or within a* given time,
in cash or other medium, a fixed amount." But the Board has been more liberal; in
Tennessee Co. v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. No. 31 (1939), the Board held that "income
notes" payable-both as to interest and principal-only out of earnings, constituted
"indebtedness."
284. The words "of any kind" were added by the 1937 Act. Prior thereto, tile Treas-
ury (Reg. 86, Art. 351-4) had attempted to confine the meaning of "indebtedness" to
"bonds, debentures, or similar obligations representing indebtedness incurred . . . for
the purpose of raising capital." But in American Foundation Co. v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A.
No. 85 (1939), the Board ruled that the Statute did not warrant any such narrow con-
struction.
285. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 405-2 (c) states that: "Ordinarily an amount used
to pay or retire an indebtedness, in whole or in part, at or prior to the maturity and in
accordance with the terms thereof will be considered reasonable . .
286. This deduction is allowed by § 504 (b).
287. In addition to the deductions mentioned, a bank affiliate is entitled to the special
credit provided in § 26 (d). This by reference from § 504 (a) to 27 (a) (1) to 27 (b) (3).
288. Section 504 (c). This deduction was first granted by the 1938 Act, presumably
to give the corporate officers an opportunity to correct, at least in part, any miscalcula-
tion they may have made in their attempt to distribute all of the corporate net income.
289. In other words, there can be shifted to the shareholders' returns for the follow-
ing year, not more than 10% of the amount included for the taxable year. For the pur-
pose of Subchapter A tax, such after-year dividends once claimed for the preceding year
are not again considered as having been paid during the actual year of payment.
290. Section 506 allows the credit and sets forth the conditions under which it may be
allowed. The statutory provisions are explained in U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Arts. 407-1 to
407-7, inclusive.
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designed to permit a corporation which has made a bona fide error in
computing its income and hence distributed an insufficient amount, to
correct the error by paying a dividend equal to the error after it becomes
certain the error has been committed.
As in the case of foreign personal holding companies, the deduction
for dividends paid291 apparently refers only to dividends which are
taxable to the shareholders (other than exempt shareholders) ;-2 and the
allowance for consent dividends is limited to the amount that would
be allowed as dividends paid credit had actual distribution been made." 3
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although Section 102 (or its predecessors) has been in the tax law
for more than twenty-five years, it has conspicuously failed to achieve its
objectives. This was demonstrated when the undistributed profits surtax
imposed by the 1936 Act, which was considerably less punitive than the
tax imposed by Section 102, caused a flood of dividend distributions -
from privately owned as well as publicly owned companies -without
serious dislocation of the corporate economic structure. -0' It is significant
that this flow of corporate distributions subsided when the undistributed
profits tax was emasculated in 1938, even allowing for the fact that
corporate earnings generally declined after 1937. The constant legisla-
tive efforts to increase the efficacy of the section also attest its relative
lack of success.
The problem of protecting the revenue without thwarting legitimate
corporate expansion is a difficult one; especially at a time like the present
when the disparity between the corporate tax rate and the individual tax
rates is so marked. But the present section is no more than a makeshift
solution. It is not sufficiently effective in the case of a controlling stock-
291. The dividends paid deduction and the consent dividends deduction are allowed by
reference from § 504 (a) to 27 (a) (1) to 27 (b) (1). The one-year net operating lots
carryover is deductible by reference from § 504 (a) to 27 (a) (1) to 27 (b) (2).
292. See pp. 203-207 supra. An illustration of the strictness with which the deduction
for dividends paid is construed is afforded by Sanford Corp. v. Comm'r, 33 B.T.A. 139
(1938), aff'd, C. C. A. 3d, Sept. 21, 1939. In this case, which, like the Foley case, in-
volved §351 (b) (2) (C) of the 1934 Act, the Sanford Company-a personal holding
company--declared a dividend one day before the close of its tax year. How, ever, the
sole stockholder, who was the only person who had authority to sign checks, was in a
distant state at the time, with the result that although funds were available and the
stockholders' account had been credited, payment of the dividend could not be and vs
not effected until about a month after the close of the year. (The company's accounts
were kept on the cash basis). Both the Board and the appellate court ruled that the
dividend had not been paid during the taxable year and hence could not be deducted in
computing the personal holding company surtax.
293. See pp. 203-204 snpra.
294. Report of WVays and Mcans Committee, H. R. RE'. No. 1560, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1938) 2.
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holder in high brackets - the maximum penalty is 35%o while the maxi-
mum individual rate is 79o - and it unfairly penalizes a non-controlling
shareholder who happens to fall in the lower tax brackets.
The problem would be far better solved by a return (with corrective
modifications.) to the provisions of the early Acts of 1913, 1916 and 1918,
under which the shareholders of a corporation found guilty of the con-
demned purpose would be taxed individually on the undistributed income
of the corporation.' 5 It is true that this method yielded little revenue
while it was in force, but this was due partly to defects %thich can easily
be eliminated and partly to the early timidity of the Treasury Department
in applying the section. In justice to the Department it should be noted
that not only the Treasury but Congress as well was beset by constitu-
tional doubts (which have since been largely dispelled), and that the
judicial temper and personnel - allowing for a certain amount of lag -
reflected economic and political conditions which were much different
then from what they are now. In view of the statement in the National
Grocery Company opinion that Congress could, if it chose, tax the share-
holder on the corporation's income,206 the constitutional spectre may be
considered embalmed.
The scheme of taxing the shareholders under the accumulation penalty
section, rather than the corporation, is substantially similar to the British
method, the principal difference being that under the British method the
reasonableness of the accumulation, rather than the motives behind it,
is made the test of applicability. 297 While this has the advantage of
determining liability by a less subjective measuring rod, it loses in flexi-
bility. The penalty may result from an honest mistake or mere difference
of opinion between the stockholders and the Government as to the reason-
ableness of the accumulation, and liability may be imposed even in the
face of the most innocent motives. The Canadian approach to the problem
of corporate accumulations is somewhat different. If the Minister of
National Revenue is of the opinion that the accumulation is unreasonable,
he may notify the corporation of the amount he considers excessive and
if such amount is not distributed during the tax year in which the notice
is given, the shareholders are deemed to have received such amount as a
dividend on the last day of such tax year.208
A tax against the shareholders rather than against the corporation is
preferable chiefly because it burdens the stockholders to the same degree
and in the same proportions that they benefited taxwise from non-distri-
295. Sherman, op. cit. supra note 51, advocated a reversion to this procedure.
296. 304 U. S. 282, 288 (1938).
297. FINANcE AcT OF 1922, § 21, as amended by §§ 31 and 32 of the FINANCE ACT OF
1927. For an explanation of the modus operandi of the British provisions, see KoNsTAm,
THE LAW OF INcOME TAX (6th ed. 1933) 336-346.
298. WAR INCOmE TAx ACT, § 13.
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bution.211 If we are to return to this system, the statutory presumptions
now in Section 102 should be retained and even strengthened. It is sug-
gested that a presumption of unreasonableness of accumulation should be
made to arise whenever a corporation fails to distribute 70% of its net
earnings provided that the current asset and liability ratio of the cor-
poration after such distribution would be better than two to one. This
would incorporate into the Statute some of the indicia of liability set
out in the Regulations."' It is recognized that particularity in a statute
precludes flexibility and may cause hardship. However, complete flexi-
bility will not be lost by virtue of the suggested presumption - a sort of
presumption within a presumption - as the failure to distribute the requi-
site amount would not ipso facto determine liability, but would only create
an inference which the taxpayer could overcome in a proper case. The
chief objection to the method of taxing the shareholders would be that
administrative difficulties might arise in the case of a corporation with
many shareholders, but such corporations are not as likely to run afoul
of the section as those with few stockholders. Another objection is that
the penalty is not severe enough: the stockholders of a corporation which
has distributed none of its earnings would be no worse off after the
application of the penalty (except for interest on the additional tax and
the expense of contesting it) than the stockholders of a corporation which
had distributed all of its earnings. This objection might be overcome by
increasing the interest rate on such deficiencies or adding an additional
penalty of say 10%. At any rate even without this additional penalty,
the proposed plan would probably produce much greater revenue than the
existing one.
If the present plan of assessing the penalty against the corporation is
to be retained, the recent decision of the Department is a step in the right
direction.301 In fact, that part which states that a failure to distribute
70% of the earnings invites scrutiny, should be incorporated into the
law, subject to the current asset and liability ratio proviso. This will
put corporations which are well able to pay dividends on the defensive,
where they belong. In addition, the maximum penalty rate should be
increased beyond 35%, since the present section loses much of its effect
in the case of a corporation whose shareholders pass the 35% bracket.
One other alteration to the section is suggested, to wit: the elimination
299. It also would minimize the possibility of injustice which might result from a
sale of stock to a purchaser not on the alert to protect himself against liability of the
company for tax under § 102.
300. See notes 60 and 61 supra.
301. T. D. 4914, IxT. REv. BuL. No. 31, at 8 (1939). See note 61 mspra. It is to
be hoped, however, that the Treasury Department, in its zeal for revenue, will not uwe
the new decision as a club with which to scare innocent taxpayers into settlements. (The
vast majority of § 102 cases are settled without litigation).
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of the net loss carryover in computing the net income which measures
the penalty tax. If the corporation is guilty of the condemned purpose
during the taxable year, there is no reason why a loss in the preceding
year should mitigate the penalty. Such loss is already taken into con-
sideration in determining whether the accumulation was unreasonable and
the proscribed purpose was present.
In 1938, the House Ways and Means Committee attempted a solution
in the form of the so-called "third basket" provision which imposed high
rates of undistributed profits surtax on closely held corporations; but
the proposal never passed the House. This method is undesirable in that
it would place closely held corporations at a disadvantage in comparison
with competing corporations whose ownership was widely diversified.
Looking through the corporate entity, there is no sound reason why a
stockholder in the Ford Motor Company- assuming that it is a closely
held corporation- should pay a higher rate of tax on his share of the
earnings than a stockholder in General Motors. Moreover, many publicly
owned companies are privately controlled: it is well known that the more
scattered the ownership of a corporation, the smaller will be the per-
centage of stock required to control it. If we are to have an undistributed
profits surtax, let it be made applicable to all corporations."0 2
With respect to personal holding companies the best solution seems to
be the taxation of the shareholders of such corporations as if they were
partners. 08 This would permit the use of such corporations for legitimate
ends without in any way interfering with the collection of federal
revenue. If it is felt that some price should be exacted by the Federal
Government for the privileges attached to corporate existence, let the
normal corporate tax imposed on corporations be applicable to such com-
panies as well. In fairness, if the shareholders are to be taxed on the
corporation's income let them also be permitted to take their propor-
tionate shares of the corporation's losses in the same way that the members
of a partnership are entitled to take their respective shares of the partner-
302. The undistributed profits surtax appears to be politically taboo. Most of the
hue and cry against the 1936 surtax was made by people who failed to realize that it did
not impose a crushing burden. The maximum tax of a corporation which distributed
only 30% of its net income was only about 25%. Report of Subcommnittce of Ways and
Means Committee, 75th Cong,, 3d Sess. (1938) 5. The British standard income tax rate
has often been as high as 25% (it is now 35%).
303. Under the 1918 Act (and up to Dec. 31, 1921, under the 1921 Act) the share-
holders of personal service corporations were taxed like the members of a partnership.
The corporation itself was not taxed. § 218. The Canadian income tax law formerly
gave the stockholders of "family corporations" an election to be taxed as partners. WAIZ
INc mE TAx Acr, §22, repealed in 1932. Concurrently, the Canadian law provides
[§ 21] that the income of "personal corporations" (corresponding roughly to our personal
holding companies) shall be deemed to be distributed on the last day of the taxable year,
whether actually distributed or not. The corporation itself is taxed only on income
which is deemed to be distributed to nonresidents.
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ship's losses. It is not contended that this method is entirely free from
complications, but the problems attached to it would certainly be no more
troublesome and would probably be simpler than those which arise out
of the present provisions. 'While it still would be necessary to retain
the elaborate provisions defining a personal holding company, it would
be possible to eliminate the distinction between foreign personal holding
companies and other personal holding companies, and to eliminate the
problems inherent in credits for dividends paid, amounts used to retire
indebtedness, deficiency dividends, etc. Moreover, the shareholders of
such companies could rest easier in their minds throughout the year,
instead of being ever on the alert to avoid the pitfalls surrounding the
present provisions. In view of recent decisions, notably the National
Grocery Company case,304 constitutional doubts about the suggested
method of taxing shareholders of personal holding companies are not
too grave.
APPENDIX
List of Cases Involving Section 02 or the Corresponding Provisions
of Prior Revenue Laws
A. Cases won by Government:
1. Mercantile or Manufacturing Corporations:
National Grocery Co. v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 163 (1936), aff'd,
304 U. S. 282 (1938), rcv'g, 92 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 3d,
1937).
2. Companies which would be now classed as personal holding corn-
panies:
a. Incorporated talent cases:
Reynard Corp. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 552 (1938).
Wim. C. DeMille Productions, Inc. v. Comm'r, 30 B.T.A.
826 (1934), petition for revic w dismissed, 80 F. (2d)
1010 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) (held taxable for three of
the five years involved).
b. Others:
Williams Investment Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 225
(Ct. Cl. 1933).
Keck Investment Co. v. Comm'r, 29 B.T.A. 143 (1933),
aff'd, 77 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), cert. denied,
296 U. S. 633 (1935).
A. D. Saenger, Inc. v. Comm'r, 33 B.T.A. 135 (1935),
aff'd, 84 F. (2d) 23 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cert. denicd,
299 U. S. 578 (1936).
304. National Grocery Co. v. Comm'r, 304 U. S. 282 (1938). Note particularly foot-
note 4 of the Court's opinion.
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Rands, Inc. v. Comm'r, 34 B.T.A. 1094 (1936), appeal
dismissed, 101 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
Almours Securities, Inc. v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 61 (1936),
aff'd, 91 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), cert. denied,
302 U. S. 765 (1938).
Nipoch Corp. v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 662 (1937).
R. L. Blaffer & Co. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 851 (1938),
aff'd, 103 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939), cert. de-
nied, U. S. Sup. Ct. No. 169 (Oct. 1939).
Mead Corp. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 687.
A. & J., Inc. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 1248 (1938).
The Beim Co. v. Landy, D. Minn., Sept. 19, 1939.
3. Miscellaneous companies:
United Business Corp. of America v. Comm'r, 19 B.T.A. 809
(1930), aff'd, 62 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. de-
nied, 290 U. S. 635 (1933) (held taxable for one of the two
years involved).
United Business Corp. of America v. Comm'r, 33 B.T.A. 83
(1935).
Edward G. Swartz, Inc. v. Comm'r, 33 B.T.A. 355 (1935).
R. & L., Inc. v. Comm'r, 33 B.T.A. 857 (1935), aff'd, 84 F.
(2d) 721 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 588
(1936).
Gardiner v. Welch, 17 A.F.T.R. 1047 (S. D. Cal. 1936).
B. Cases won by taxpayer:
1. Mercantile or Manufacturing Corporations:
R. C. Tway Sales Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 668 (W.
D. Ky. 1933), aff'd, 75 F. (2d) 336 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935).
Charleston Lumber Co. v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 83 (S.
D. W. Va. 1937), petition for review dismissed, 93 F. (2d)
1018 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
C. H. Spitzner & Son, Inc. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 511 (1938).
Dill Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939).
J. E. Baker Co. v. Comm'r, B.T.A. Docket No. 87,758, June
6, 1939.
2. Companies which would now be classed as personal holding com-
panies:
a. Incorporated talent cases:
Cecil B. DeMille et al. v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 1161 (1935),
aff'd, 90 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), cert. denied,
302 U. S. 713 (1937).
Fisher & Fisher, Inc. v. Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 211 (1935),
aff'd per curiam, 84 F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
b. Others:
Irvington Investment Co. v. Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 1165
(1935).
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Sauk Investment Co. v. Comm'r, 34 B.T.A. 732 (1936).
W. S. Farish & Co. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 150 (1938),
aff'd, 104 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
Mellbank Corp. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 1108 (1938).
Mellon et a., Executors v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 1259
(1938).
Rofam, Inc. v. Conmm'r, Memo. B.T.A. Docket No. 81,597,
Apr. 17, 1937.
Industrial Bankers Securities Corp. v. Higgins, 104 F.
(2d) 177 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
3. Miscellaneous companies:
Seaboard Security Co. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 560 (1938).
C. Cases involving the section only indirectly:
French Mortgage & Bond Co. v. Woodworth, 38 F. (2d) 841
(E. D. Mich. 1930) (holds that injunction will not lie to
prevent collection of penalty tax).
Kales v. Woodworth, 32 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929),
aff'g, 20 F. (2d) 395 (E. D. Mich. 1927), cert. dended, 280
U. S. 570 (1929) (shareholder sought to invoke application
of Sec. 3 of 1916 Act).
Stern v. Comm'r, 11 B.T.A. 1309 (1928) (shareholder sought
to deduct share of corporate loss).
